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REALTY SHELTERS: NONRECOURSE FINANCING, TAX
REFORM, AND PROFIT PURPOSE
by
Donald . Weidner*
T he Tax Reform Act of 1976 made sweeping changes in the area of tax
shelters. Real estate tax shelters are the only ones to survive with any
semblance of their former vitality. Two rules were introduced to prevent
investors from claiming tax losses in excess of amounts they place "at
risk," and neither rule considers a nonrecourse liability an amount "at
risk." The first applies to four specific tax shelters, not including real es-
tate, and the second is a catchall that applies to all partnerships other than
real estate partnerships. Thus, it is only in the real estate area that the use
of nonrecourse financing continues unchanged. The purpose of this Article
is to explain the extent to which nonrecourse financing may be used to
increase depreciable basis, trace the direction of congressional response to
real estate tax shelters, and identify doctrines the Internal Revenue Service
and the courts can be expected to apply to arrangements they find particu-
larly abusive.
I. INTRODUCTION TO TAX SHELTER
The term "tax shelter" is usually used in one of two ways. One defini-
tion of a tax shelter is an investment through which an individual pays tax
on a smaller amount than the amount of cash actually received. In this
sense, a municipal bond is considered a tax shelter because no tax need be
paid on its interest income. In an investment in depreciable real estate, a
tax shelter in this broad sense exists in any year in which the depreciation
deduction exceeds the amount of cash that is used to retire the principal on
outstanding indebtedness. Stated differently, taxable income will be less
than the net amount of cash generated by a real estate investment when-
ever the deduction for the noncash expense of depreciation exceeds the
amount of money applied to repay principal on indebtedness, a cash ex-
pense for which there is no corresponding deduction. The essential point
is that there is a gap between deductions that are available without current
cash expenditures and actual cash expenditures that are not deductible.,
For example, no matter what the other income and expense items in con-
Copyright 1978 by Donald J. Weidner.
B.S., Fordham University; J.D., University of Texas at Austin. Professor of Law,
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1. Thus, it would be more precise to say that there will be tax shelter in the broad sense
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nection with a property, if depreciation is $100 and debt amortization is
$80, taxable income will be $20 less than the net cash produced. If there is
an overall cash loss, the tax loss will be $20 greater than the cash loss.
Investment advisors who specialize in real estate, however, are likely to
respond that their clients who seek "tax shelter" are using the term in a
more restrictive sense. High bracket investors in real estate often want
more from their real estate investments than a flow of cash that is currently
free from tax. They seek tax losses that can be passed through to them and
used to offset, or "shelter," their income from other sources. Current cash
flow, indeed, may be of little or no immediate interest. As shall be illus-
trated more fully below, it is extremely common for investments in depre-
ciable real estate to produce a stream of cash flow that is currently
sheltered from tax and, at the same time, generate tax losses that can be
used by the investor to offset income from other sources. In effect, two
different commodities are produced annually: cash benefits and tax bene-
fits.
Tax shelter can perhaps best be demonstrated by deriving a year's tax
consequences from that same year's cash consequences. The net cash flow
for any year is, most basically, cash received minus cash spent. In rental
properties, whether they are apartments, offices, or retailing concerns, net
cash flow (NCF) consists of rent receipts (RR) minus real estate taxes
(RT), maintenance expenses (ME), principal repaid on indebtedness (P),
and interest paid on indebtedness (I). Consider, for example, the follow-
ing statement of one year's net cash flow from Blackacre Apartments:
NCF= RR -RT-ME- (P+I)
= $10,000 - 500 - 400 - (900 + 8,000)
= $200
The taxable income or loss of Blackacre Apartments for the year in ques-
tion can be derived by making two adjustments to the net cash flow: add
back in principal repayment (P) and subtract the appropriate depreciation
deduction (D). The effect of these two adjustments is to convert the year's
cash reality into that same year's tax reality. Principal repayment was
subtracted in the computation of net cash flow because it is an actual cash
expense. It must be added back to convert net cash flow into taxable in-
come or loss because it is a nondeductible expense. Conversely, deprecia-
tion must be subtracted from net cash flow. Depreciation did not enter
into the computation of net cash flow because it is a deduction available
without a current cash expense. If the Blackacre Apartments' deprecia-
tion deduction for the year in question is $1,200, the taxable income or loss
is computed as follows:
TI=NCF+ P-D
= $200 + 900 - 1,200
= ($100)
in any year in which the depreciation deduction, available without a cash outlay, exceeds the
sum of the nondeductible cash outlays for debt amortization and capital improvement.
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Thus, for the year in question, Blackacre Apartments has produced a posi-
tive cash flow of $200 and a tax loss of $100.
Stating taxable income or loss in terms of net cash flow makes it clear
that tax shelter depends solely on the relationship between principal repay-
ment and the depreciation deduction. If principal repayment equals de-
preciation, the two cancel each other out and taxable income, or loss, is the
same amount as the amount of positive, or negative, net cash flow. In
other words, the owner of Blackacre Apartments must pay tax on the same
amount as the amount of dollars he actually receives. Whenever the de-
preciation deduction is greater than principal repayment, however, he will
only be required to pay tax on a lesser amount than the amount of cash
actually received. Indeed, in the above example, he not only is free from
paying tax currently, he also has a tax loss. An investment in depreciable
real estate is a tax shelter in this more narrow sense whenever the deprecia-
tion deduction is greater than the sum of net cash flow and principal re-
paid on indebtedness; when, after all the net cash flow and debt
amortization2 are "sheltered" from tax, tax losses remain.
II. THE COLLAPSE OF TAX SHELTER
The extent to which a particular investment achieves tax shelter usually
changes constantly over time. Typically, tax shelter diminishes, disap-
pears, and the reverse of tax shelter becomes the case: the investment be-
comes one in which the investor must pay tax on a greater amount than the
amount of cash actually received. The reason for this collapse of tax shel-
ter is that the two determinants of tax shelter, principal repayment and
depreciation, generally change over time. Most typically, real estate is fi-
nanced with level payment mortgages that are fully amortized at the end
of a regular schedule of payments. In such mortgages early debt service
payments consist almost entirely of interest. As time passes, a greater por-
tion of each payment is attributable to the nondeductible expense of prin-
cipal repayment. Further, if an accelerated method of computing
depreciation is used, depreciation deductions will at the same time be get-
ting smaller. Thus, as the life of the investment progresses, principal repay-
ment (P) will be getting larger and depreciation (D) will be getting smaller.
The tax shelter collapses when D is equal to P. Indeed, the situation dete-
riorates further as P becomes greater than D. Consider the above illustra-
tion of Blackacre Apartments in a year in which net cash flow is still $200.
Assume, however, that the loan is much later in its life and that $8,000 of
the $8,900 debt service payments for the year is attributable to principal
repayment, and that only $900 is attributable to interest. Assume, further,
that the depreciation deduction in this later year is only $700. Even though
the cash flow remains at $200, the taxable income or loss is now computed
as follows:
2. The term "debt amortization" is used herein to refer to the repayment of the out-
standing principal on indebtedness. There are those who use the term more loosely to denote
total debt service payments, that is, combined payments of principal plus interest.
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TI = NCF+ P - D
= $200 + 8,000 - 700
= $7,500
Thus, although the basic cash reality remains the same, the tax reality has
changed dramatically; in this subsequent year the owner of Blackacre
Apartments must report ordinary income of $7,500 even though net cash
flow is only $200.
III. NONRECOURSE FINANCING IN GENERAL
Real estate tax shelters would not be as popular as they are if investors
were permitted to claim tax losses only up to the amount of their actual
cash investments in an enterprise. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the
amount of borrowed funds used to acquire depreciable real property is
included in the property's depreciable cost, or basis, even if the borrower
incurs no personal liability on the indebtedness and the only security for
repayment is a mortgage of the property acquired. Stated differently, an
investor may treat the entire price of depreciable real property as his de-
preciable investment in that property, even if the property is acquired en-
tirely with borrowed funds, and even if the property acquisition loans are
fully nonrecourse. The effect of this rule is that investors may claim de-
preciation deductions, or the tax losses that result,3 in amounts far in ex-
cess of their actual cash investments. The three principal cases that
support this rule that treats nonrecourse loans as if they were loans the
borrower is personally obligated to repay are Crane v. Commissioner, 4 Ma-
nuel D. Mayerson,5 and Bolger v. Commissioner.6
A. Crane v. Commissioner
Crane v. Commissioner7 is the grand old Supreme Court case on nonre-
course liabilities. Mrs. Crane had inherited an apartment building subject
to8 a mortgage in the principal amount of $255,000, which also secured
$7,000 of interest that was in arrears. Seven years later, Mrs. Crane sold
the building for $2,500 cash to a purchaser who also took subject to the
$255,000 mortgage. The issue before the Court was how to compute her
gain on the sale.
The Internal Revenue Code at the time defined gain on sale as "the
excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis."9 The
question was whether Mrs. Crane's "amount realized" was simply the
3. See the discussion of partnership allocations at text accompanying notes 105-115
infra.
4. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
6. 59 T.C. 760 (1973). For an excellent discussion of this case, see Lurie, Bolger'r
Building. The Tax Shelter that Wore No Clothes, 28 TAX L. REV. 355 (1973).
7. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
8. Throughout this Article the term "subject to a mortgage" is used to identify situa-
tions in which the owner of mortgaged property is free from personal liability on the indebt-
edness secured by the mortgage.
9. 331 U.S. at 5.
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$2,500 cash she received, or whether it also included the $255,000 mort-
gage to which her vendee took subject.' ° The Code defined "amount real-
ized" as "the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received."" Mrs. Crane conceded that if she
had been personally liable on the mortgage and the purchaser had either
paid or assumed it, the amount so paid or assumed would be considered a
part of her "amount realized" within the meaning of the Code. The Court
stated that earlier cases had
already repudiated the notion that there must be an actual receipt by
the seller self of 'money' or 'other property,' in their narrowest
senses. It was thought. . . that the taxpayer was the 'beneficiary' of
the payment in 'as real and substantial [a sense] as if the money had
been paid it and then paid over by it to its creditors." 2
Mrs. Crane, however, protested that the reasoning of the earlier cases did
not apply to her situation. She was not a "real and substantial benefici-
ary" because (a) she had never been personally liable on the mortgage and
(b) her vendee neither paid nor promised to pay the mortgage.
The Supreme Court rejected her argument in an opinion that empha-
sized that she received at least some cash from the sale:
[A] mortgagor, not personally liable on the debt, who sells the prop-
erty subject to the mort a e and for additional consideration, realizes a
benefit in the amount of the mortgage as well as the boot. . . We are
. . . concerned with the reality that an owner of property, mortgaged
at afigure less than that at which the property will sell, must and will
treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were his per-
sonal obligations. If he transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit
to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or
as if aPersonal debt in an equal amount had been assumed by an-
other.' 3
Mrs. Crane had said that it was unrealistic to say that she was economi-
cally compelled to treat the mortgage as if she were personally liable on it.
"[B]y all dictates of common sense," she argued, the apartment building
was "a ruinous disaster."' 4 As soon as she had inherited the property, she
entered into an agreement under which she turned over all net receipts to
the mortgagee. Not only was she not receiving any cash from the build-
ing, the mortgage was going even further into default. Over the seven-year
period she owned the building, not only was no principal repaid on the
mortgage, but also the interest in arrears had increased from $7,000 to
$16,000. Nevertheless, said the Court, she had properly been claiming de-
preciation deductions computed on a tax basis that included the amount of
the mortgage: "[tihe crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits her
10. The Court stated: "The Commissioner explains that only the principal amount,
rather than the total present debt secured by the mortgage, was deemed to be a measure of
the amount realized, because the difference was attributable to interest due, a deductible
item." 331 U.S. at 4 n.6.
11. Id. at 5-6.
12. Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938)).
13. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 15.
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to exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing gain."15
In today's terms, Crane stands for the proposition that a taxpayer receives
a constructive distribution of cash to the extent he is relieved of liability,
even if the liability is nonrecourse as to him, and even if he is relieved of it
only in the sense that he has transferred the property securing the liability
to a nonassuming grantee. Stated differently, because you include a non-
recourse purchase money liability in your depreciable basis just as if it
were with recourse, you must also treat the liability as if it were with re-
course when you part with the property.
Recall that the Court's opinion was couched in terms of a transfer that
had resulted in boot to the taxpayer. Would Mrs. Crane have avoided the
constructive distribution of cash had she transferred the property without
receiving boot, or if she had simply abandoned it? Widespread interest in
this question became pointed in the early 1970's when many real proper-
ties were in default and mortgaged in excess of value. Many looked long-
ingly at the Court's now famous footnote thirty-seven:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the
mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a
benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem
might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or
transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is
not this case.' 6
Overwhelming opinion has been that this dictum is not reliable because
Crane stands for the proposition that nonrecourse liability will be treated
as with recourse liability for the purpose of taxing constructive distribu-
tions of cash. Nevertheless, just to be safe, the Internal Revenue Service
in 1976 issued a Revenue Ruling that quoted and specifically repudiated
footnote thirty-seven.' 7
B. Manuel D. Mayerson." Standing Notes
Crane represented a victory for the Internal Revenue Service insofar as
it established that a taxpayer receives a constructive distribution of cash
when he or she transfers property subject to a nonrecourse liability. Ma-
nuel D. Mayerson,1 on the other hand, represents a victory for the tax
shelter industry insofar as it indicates the extent to which a purchaser may
claim that he has made a depreciable investment in real estate by incurring
a nonrecourse liability. Mayerson involved a taxpayer who "purchased"
an office building with a nonrecourse, standing note. A standing note is
one in which the principal balance remains outstanding until some future
time, until which time not even periodic repayment of principal occurs.
Standing notes are frequently used in construction financing and in the
financing of distress properties. A standing note is often desirable to its
15. Id.
16. Id. at 14 n.37.
17. Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214. See also MiUar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656
(1977), aff'd, No. 77-1926 (3d Cir. June 12, 1978); Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974-1 C.B. 159.
18. 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
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maker because it eliminates current payments for the nondeductible ex-
pense of amortization and, hence, maximizes tax shelter.
Mayerson "purchased" what had been an unprofitable office building
for a minimal downpayment of $10,000 and a note to the vendor that:
(a) provided that no repayment of its face amount of principal,
$322,500, need be made until the expiration of ninety-nine years;
(b) required monthly "interest" payments of $1,500;
(c) was fully nonrecourse as to the principal;
(d) was with recourse as to the monthly interest payments as they
accrued; and
(e) provided for substantial discounts if paid in the next one
($27.5,000) or three ($298,000) years.
Five years after signing the note and taking possession, Mayerson negoti-
ated a reduced repayment price of $200,000.
The Service argued that Mayerson was not entitled to claim deprecia-
tion deductions on the building prior to the time the reduced purchase
price was negotiated and paid. It said that depreciation deductions are
available to taxpayers who make "investments" in depreciable property,
but that Mayerson's nonrecourse standing note did not constitute an "in-
vestment." The Service's position was that the benefit of the depreciation
deduction, a deduction theoretically premised on the physical deteriora-
tion of the property, inures to the person who bears the economic burden
of the deterioration. The economic burden of the depreciation was not
transferred to Mayerson by the "sale," said the Service, because his note
for the purchase price did not constitute an enforceable obligation to pay a
sum certain. The Service focused on the fact that the note was nonre-
course, that no principal was due until the expiration of ninety-nine years,
and that there were substantial discounts for early payment. The Service
considered Mayerson not as an owner, but as a tenant under a lease with
an option to purchase. Accordingly, the Service disallowed Mayerson's
depreciation deductions. Following its lease analysis, the Service said that
Mayerson's $10,000 cash "downpayment" was actually a payment for a
favorable lease. It allowed this $10,000 lease premium payment to be am-
ortized over the life of the lease, which it determined to be ninety-nine
years. The Service's concern was quite understandable because Mayerson
had a lesser liability under his purchase money note and mortgage than
does the usual tenant under a lease with an option to purchase; Mayerson
was only personally obligated to pay interest as it accrued, and he could
stop interest from accruing at any time by reconveying to his grantor.
The Service lost, even though the Tax Court stoutly declared:
It is well accepted. . . that depreciation is not predicated upon own-
ership of roperty but rather upon an investment in property. It
therefe follows that the benefit of the depreciation deduction sould
inure to those who would suffer an economic loss caused by wear and
exhaustion of the business property.' 9
19. Id. at 350 (citations omitted).
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Without explaining how Mayerson undertook the economic burden of de-
preciation simply by signing the nonrecourse note, the Tax Court stated
that Crane applies as fully to a taxpayer who acquires property by
purchase as it does to a taxpayer who acquires property by inheritance.2 °
It said that the nonrecourse nature of the note did not negate an "invest-
ment" by Mayerson, using language suggestive of a right to equal protec-
tion for nonrecourse borrowers:
The element of the lack of personal liability has little real signifi-
cance due to common business practices. As we have indicated in
our findings it is not at all unusual in current mortgage financing of
income-producing properties to limit liability to the property in-
volved. Taxpayers who are not personally liable for encumbrances on
property should be allowed depreciation deductions affording competitive
equality with taxpayers who are personally liable for encumbrances or
taxpayers who own unencumbered property. The effect of such a
policy is to give the taxpayer an advance credit for the amount of the
mortgage. This appears to be reasonable since it can be assumed that
a capital investment in the amount of the mortgage will eventually
occur despite the absence of personal liability.2'
The court concluded that, although the ninety-nine year term for maturity
was unusually long, the standing feature did not destroy the status of the
note as a genuine indebtedness. Nor did the discounts for early payment
indicate that the amount of indebtedness was too.indefinite to be included
in depreciable basis. Accordingly, Mayerson had properly computed de-
preciation on a tax cost basis that included the full face amount of the
note.22
A Warning about Mayerson. Mayerson should not be relied upon by tax-
payers to "up" their bases by the use of artificially inflated purchase prices.
Mayerson involved arm's length negotiations between parties who were
strangers, and Mayerson immediately made substantial expenditures to
make the office building profitable. The Service emphasized in its acquies-
cence in Mayerson that the case could not be relied upon "except in situa-
tions where it is clear that the property has been acquired at its fair market
value in an arm's length transaction creating a bona fide purchase and a
bona fide debt obligation. "23
In Marcus v. Commissioner24 the taxpayers were too greedy. They used
nonrecourse notes with inflated purchase prices and maturities well in ex-
cess of the useful life of the assets. The Tax Court stated that it was diffi-
cult to conceive of a situation in which the taxpayers would continue to
make payments "where the property in question no longer had any useful
20. The court specifically rejected the Service's argument "that the Crane case should
not apply in a purchase situation since the basis in that [inheritance] case started with fair
market value and not cost, as in the case of a purchase." Id. at 351.
21. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 352-54.
23. Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59. See also Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544
F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
24. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1263 (1971).
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life and where they would incur no financial liability for failure to make
such payments."25 Hence, the court held the purchasers' "liability and the
amount of the obligation incurred were contingent and not ascertainable"
and "not determinative for purposes of establishing a basis for deprecia-
tion."26
C. Bolger v. Commissioner.- Tax Shelter in Extremis
Bolger v. Commissioner27 is perhaps the most stunning victory of the tax
shelter industry. In Bolger the Service challenged ten different transac-
tions put together by Bolger, a real estate professional. Although there
were differences among the ten transactions, they followed the same basic
pattern, and the Tax Court treated the case as one involving a class of
transactions rather than considering each transaction separately.
The basic pattern was as follows. First, Bolger would form "a financing
corporation" with an initial capitalization of $1,000. The shareholders of
the corporation were the individual investors who ultimately would receive
title to the building acquired. Bolger would then arrange to have the cor-
poration purchase a building that a manufacturing or commercial concern,
the user, desired to lease. In several of the transactions the seller was the
user who would lease back the building. As described by the court:
Then, within several days, and, more often, on the same day, all of the
following transactions would take place: (1) The seller would convey
the property to the financing corporation; (2) the financing corpora-
tion would enter into a lease with the user; and (3) the financing cor-
poration would then sell its own negotiable interest-bearing corporate
notes in an amount equal to the purchase price to an institutional
lender (or lenders, as the case might be) pursuant to a note purchase
agreement (as the document was usually called), which would provide
that the notes be secured by a first mortgage (which sometimes took
the form of a deed of trust), and by an assignment of the lease.2"
The mortgage notes provided for payments to be made over a period
equal to or less than the primary term of the lease to the user. The users
were to pay their rent directly to the mortgagee in satisfaction of the fi-
nancing corporation's secured notes. The mortgagee was to apply those
rentals to the notes and pay any remainder over to the financing corpora-
tion. There was, however, little, if any, surplus to be paid over to the
"owner," initially the financing corporation and ultimately its transferees,
because the rental paid by the users was either equal to or just slightly
above the debt service due the mortgagee.
As mentioned above, the basic lease term was always equal to or greater
than the term of the mortgage notes, which all required constant payments
roughly equal to the rental. In addition, the leases were all "net leases,"
that is, the rent which was paid by the user directly to the mortgagee was
25. Id. at 1273.
26. Id.
27. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
28. Id. at 761-62.
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"net" of all expenses; the lessee was responsible for all property taxes,
maintenance and repair expenses, and insurance. 29  The lessee-user's in-
terest was subordinated to the mortgage, and the lessees were liable for the
rent even if the building were destroyed. In the event of such destruction,
however, "the lessee had the right to purchase the property. . for a price
set in accordance with a schedule attached to the lease which approxi-
mated the amount required from the lessor to prepay the note. Refusal to
accept the offer of purchase would result in the termination of the lease."3
In addition to the basic lease term, which was typically from twenty-five to
twenty-eight years, each user had a series of options to renew, at substan-
tially reduced rental, for four or five five-year renewal periods.
As soon as the financing corporation closed the purchase, mortgage, and
lease, it would convey the property to its shareholders for "one dollar and
other valuable consideration," subject to the lease and mortgage, without
any cash payment or promise thereof by the transferee. In each transac-
tion, Bolger was either a 25% or a 100% transferee. The transfer was an-
ticipated by the mortgage, which also required the fimancing corporation
to remain in existence and to refrain from any activity other than in con-
nection with owning and leasing the specific property in question.
Bolger and the other transferees were required by the mortgagee to sign an
"Assumption Agreement," which was window dressing because it pro-
vided that the transferee would incur no personal liability in connection
with the mortgage he was "assuming."
The Service disallowed Bolger's claim to depreciation deductions on the
buildings. The Service did not challenge the transactions on the ground
that they were, in substance, only secured loans to the long term lessees.
Rather, it sought to establish that the depreciable interests were in the fi-
nancing corporations and had not passed to Bolger and his fellow transfer-
ees. The Tax Court described the issues before it as follows:
The two issues upon which resolution of [the question whether Bolger
was entitled to claim depreciation deductions] depends are: (1) Should
the corporations from which [Bolger] acquired his ownership interest
in the properties be recognized as separate viable entities; and (2) if
they should be so recognized, are they or [Bolger] entitled to an allow-
ance for depreciation and for other related items.32
The court held that the financing corporations were separate taxable enti-
ties, both before and after they transferred their assets to their sharehold-
29. Throughout this Article the term "net lease" shall refer to a lease that is perfectl
"net," that is, to one that requires the lessee to absorb all expenses. There are individuals
who employ terms such as 'double net lease" and "triple net lease" to refer to different
degrees of "net-ness." The presence and meaning of such terms appear to depend on local
custom.
30. Id. at 762. The lessee further agreed to indemnify the lessor from any liability
from any occurrence on the property. The lessee could sublease or assign his interest, "pro-
viding the sublessee or assignee promised to comply with the terms of the mortgage or lease
and further providing the lessee remain personally liable for the performance of all its obli-
gations under the lease." Id. at 762-63.
31. Id. The loans were made through the financing corporations in part to avoid state
law limitations on loans to individuals. Id. at 766.
32. Id. at 765-66.
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ers. It also held, however, that the transfers effectively conveyed the
depreciable interest in the properties to the shareholders. The Tax Court
rejected the Service's assertion that
[blecause of the long term leases and the commitments of the rentals
to the payment of the mortgages. . . the conveyances by each corpo-
ration transferred only a reversionary interest in the buildings and
that consequently [Bolger] did not acquire a present interest in the
properties which may be depreciated for tax purposes.33
The court held that the corporations had conveyed their depreciable inter-
ests in the buildings to Bolger and the other shareholders, and then pro-
ceeded to determine the transferees' bases in those buildings. For
example, in the case of the buildings transferred solely to Bolger, the issue
was whether Bolger's basis was the one dollar consideration stated in the
deeds or whether his basis also included the amount of purchase money
financing subject to which Bolger took title. The court held that the un-
paid balance of the mortgage was included in Bolger's basis, even though
he never assumed any personal liability thereon. Quoting from
Mayerson, the court explained that the effect of Crane is "to give the tax-
payer an advance credit for the amount of the mortgage. This appears to
be reasonable since it can be assumed that a capital investment in the
amount of the mortgage will eventually occur despite the absence of per-
sonal liability."
34
The Service argued that it was unreasonable to assume that Bolger
would pay off the mortgage because he had no significant interest to pro-
tect. His cash flow was either minimal or nonexistent, and the properties
were mortgaged to the full extent of value. The court responded that the
Service's argument overlooked the fact that Bolger would be building up
an equity in the property as the rents paid by the users were applied to
amortize the mortgage. The court reasoned that "[tihis increase in equity
will benefit [Bolger] either by way of gain in the event of a sale or the
creation of refinancing potential. Moreover, [Bolger] will seek to protect
his interest in the property in order to retain the benefits of any apprecia-
tion in its fair value."' 35 The opinion also emphasized that the rents were
includable in Bolger's income even though they were assigned to the
lender to service the debt. Noting that the normal owner applies rent to
debt service, the court concluded that Bolger should not be treated less
favorably simply because he was not personally liable for the amount of
the mortgage, stating: "The combination of the benefits of accelerated de-
preciation and the Crane doctrine produces a bitter pill for [the Service] to
swallow. We see no way of sugarcoating that pill, short of overruling
Crane v. Commissioner, supra, which we are not at liberty to do."3 6
33. Id. at 768.
34. Id. at 770 (emphasis in original).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 771. But see Davis v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 260 (1976).
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IV. LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND NONRECOURSE LOANS
Regulations under the Code specify how the Crane rule operates in the
case of limited partnerships. A brief word on partnership taxation should
precede our discussion of those Regulations. Partnerships are tax reporting
but not tax paying entities. Income is taxed directly to the individual part-
ners with no taxation at the partnership level. Partnership tax losses, un-
like corporate tax losses, are "passed through" to the individual partners
and can be used by them to offset their income from other sources. Cer-
tain elections, however, are made at the partnership level that bind all the
partners, such as the choice of method for computing depreciation.37 The
partnership computes and reports its various items of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit, and the individual partners report their allocable
shares.
Crane applies at both the level of the partnership and the level of the
individual partner. At the partnership level, Crane permits the partner-
ship to compute depreciation deductions on the basis of the full acquisition
cost of partnership property, even if the property is acquired solely with
funds borrowed on a nonrecourse basis. At the level of the individual
partner, Crane, under certain conditions, permits a limited partner to
claim tax losses in excess of the amount he invests in the partnership.
A partner may only claim partnership tax losses to the extent of his ad-
justed basis in his partnership interest.31 A partner's initial basis in his
partnership interest is the amount of money he contributes to the partner-
ship, plus the adjusted basis of any property he contributes. 39 The Code,
however, specifically provides that a partner shall be treated as having
contributed additional money to the partnership to the extent he shares in
partnership liabilities.' Under the Regulations, the members of a general
partnership are automatically allocated a share of partnership liabilities in
proportion to their share of partnership losses.4' In the case of a limited
partnership, the general rule is "a limited partner's share of partnership
liabilities shall not exceed the difference between his actual contribution
credited to him by the partnership and the total contribution which he is
obligated to make under the partnership agreement."42 The Regulations,
however, contain an exception on which the real estate limited partnership
tax shelter is based:
However, where none of the partners have any personal liability with
respect to a partnership liability (as in the case of a mortgage on real
37. I.R.C. § 703(b).
38. Losses that are currently not deductible because basis is depleted are not perma-
nently lost; in effect, they are placed in a suspense account and become deductible in later
years to the extent of any subsequent increases in the partner's basis in his partnership inter-
est. Id. § 704(d).
39. Id. § 722.
40. Id. § 752(a) provides: "Any increase in a partner's share of the liabilities of a part-
nership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the assumption by
such partner of partnership liabilities, shall be considered as a contribution of money by
such partner to the partnership."




estate acquired by the partnership without the assumption by the part-
nership or any of the partners of any liability on the mortgage), then
all partners, including limited partners, shall be considered as sharing
such liability under section 752(c) in the same proportion as they
share the profits.43
The effect of this exception is that limited partners may deduct partnership
tax losses in amounts far in excess of their actual cash investments in the
partnership, provided there are nonrecourse liabilities they can use to "up"
their bases." For example, limited partner L contributes $100 to a lim-
ited partnership and receives a ten percent interest in partnership profits.
At the time of the contribution, the partnership owns property that is sub-
ject to a mortgage in the amount of $1,000,000 on which none of the part-
ners is personally liable. L shares in the partnership nonrecourse liability
for basis purposes in accordance with his profit sharing ratio; that is, L is
treated as having made an additional $100,000 contribution of cash to the
partnership. Accordingly, L's initial basis in his partnership interest is
$100,100.
Even after years of popularity of the limited partnership form, what
many limited partners fail to realize, or choose to ignore, is that there is a
converse treatment of liabilities in later years. The Code treats a partner as
having received a distribution of cash to the extent his share in partnership
liabilities is decreased,45 even if the liabilities are nonrecourse. Just as a
limited partner is automatically allocated a share of the partnership's non-
recourse liabilities when he receives his interest in profits, he is automati-
cally relieved of his share of partnership liabilities when he parts with his
interest in profits. Thus, a limited partner who sells or abandons his part-
nership interest receives a constructive distribution of cash to the extent he
is "relieved" of his share of nonrecourse liabilities.46
43. Id. I.R.C. § 752(c) provides: "For purposes of this section, a liability to which
property is subject shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such property, be consid-
ered as a liability of the owner of the property.
44. This exception also permits partners to receive, without current taxation, cash distri-
bution in excess of their actual cash or property investments in the partnership. Under Id. §
73 l(a)(1), a partner only recognizes gain on a distribution from his partnership to the extent
that the distribution exceeds his adjusted basis in his partnership interest.
45. Id. § 752(b) provides: "Any decrease in a partner's share of the liabilities of a part-
nership, or any decrease in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the assumption by
the partnership of such idivdual liabilites, shall be considered as a distribution of money
to the partner by the partnership."
46. Rev. Rul. 74-40, 19741 C.B. 159, illustrates this point:Situation 3. Instead of selling his interest L withdraws from the partnership
at a time when the adjusted basis of his interest in the partnership is zero and
his proportionate share of partnership liabilities, all of which consist of liabili-
ties on which neither partners nor the partnership have assumed
any personal liability, is $15,000.
Accordingly, L is considered to have received a distribution of money fromthe partnership of$15,000 and realizes a gain of $15,000 determined under the
provisions of section 731(a) of the Code.
Id. at 160. The recapture provisions may require that part of the gain resulting from the
constructive distribution of cash be taxed as ordina income. See text accompanying notes
76-84 rn/ra.
19781
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
A. Strict Requirements to "Up" a Limited Partner's Basis
There are three basic ways in which the Service has narrowly confined
the ability of a limited partner to "up" his basis by a share of partnership
liabilities. First, it has strictly construed the general rule that a limited
partner's share of partnership liabilities shall not exceed the difference be-
tween his actual contribution and the total contribution he is obligated to
make under the partnership agreement. Second, it has required that the
form, and not just the substance, of nonrecourse financing be strictly ad-
hered to. Third, it has strictly construed the definition of what constitutes
a partnership "liability" in which a limited partner might share.
Revenue Ruling 69-22347 strictly construed the Regulation that contains
the general rule that a limited partner's share of partnership liabilities shall
not exceed the difference between his actual contribution and "the total
contribution which he is obligated to make under the limited partnershp
agreement."48 The Ruling involved a limited partnership in which G was
the general partner and L the limited partner. The limited partnership
agreement provided that G and L were to share partnership losses in the
same percentage as they shared profits, ten percent for G and ninety per-
cent for L, but that L [was] not liable for any losses or obligations of the
partnership in excess of his initial capital contribution in the amount of
100x dollars."4 9 The limited partnership agreement also provided that
as between G and L, each partner is liable for all losses and obliga-
tions of the partnership in proportion to his respective capital and
profits interest. The contract further provided that . . . if G should
be required to pay more than his pro rata share of partnership liabili-
ties, he is entitled to repayment from L for the excess amount so paid.
However, these provisions . . . expressly state that they are not in-
tended for the benefit of third party creditors, and that such creditors
shall not obtain any rights thereunder."0
The limited partnership acquired real property and assumed an existing
mortgage of $50x. The issue was whether L's basis in his partnership
interest was increased by a portion of the mortgage liability the partner-
ship assumed. The Service ruled that it was not, quoting the following
Regulation: "[A] limited partner's share of partnership liabilities shall not
exceed the difference between his actual contribution credited to him by
the partnership and the total contribution which he is obligated to make
under the limited partnership agreement."5" The Service ruled that the
"total contribution which [the limited partner] is obligated to make under
the partnership agreement" refers to "contributions which the limited part-
ner is obligated to make to the partnershp."2 The Service stated:
In this case, L is not obligated to make any further contributions to
the limited partnership beyond his initial contribution of 100x dollars.
47. 1969-1 C.B. 184.
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1957) (emphasis added).
49. 1969-1 C.B. at 184.
50. Id.
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1957).
52. 1969-1 C.B. at 184.
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The provision in the limited partnership agreement that if G is re-
quired to pay more than his pro rata share of partnership liabilities,
he is entitled to repayment from L for the excess amount so paid, is
between the general and the limited partner in their individual capaci-
ties and is not an obligation of the limited partner to make a contribu-
tion to the partnership.5
3
The Service concluded that L was not entitled to increase his basis in his
partnership interest by any part of the $50x mortgage liability, and that
G's basis was increased by the full amount.
This Ruling can be criticized on several grounds. First, L's obligation
to indemnify G fell within the literal terms of the Regulation because it
was a payment L was required to make "under the limited partnership
agreement." The Regulation contains no language that disqualifies an ob-
ligation that, although in the partnership agreement, is made by the part-
ner "in his individual capacity." Second, to the extent the Ruling imposes
a distinction between obligations incurred by a partner in his individual
capacity as opposed to obligations incurred by a partner in his capacity as
a member of the partnership, it imposes a distinction that is difficult, if not
impossible, to make. Both for state law purposes54 and federal income tax
purposes55 it has long been considered perplexing to try to distinguish be-
tween a partner acting in his individual capacity and a partner acting in his
capacity as a partner. Finally, under the "at risk" rules of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, L's promise to indemnify G would reduce G's amount "at
risk":
[A] taxpayer's capital is not at risk in the business. . . to the extent he
is protected against economic loss . . . by reason of an agreement or
arrangement for compensation or reimbursement to him of any loss
which he may suffer. Under this concept, an investor is not 'at risk' if
he. . .is entitled to reimbursement for part or all of any loss by rea-
son of a binding agreement between himself and another person.
56
Although the "at risk" rules do not apply to real estate, they do apply to
non-real-estate partnerships, and it is hard to understand why a limited
partner's promise to indemnify a general partner is sufficiently substantial
to reduce the amount by which the general partner is "at risk," yet insuffi-
ciently substantial to increase the limited partner's basis in his partnership
interest.
53. Id. at 184-85.
54. J. STORY, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 52 (2d ed. 1846) (emphasis in original):
The distinction, as thus presented, does certainly wear the appearance of no
small subtlety and refinement, and scarcely meets the mind m a clear and
unambiguous form; for the question must still recur; when may a party prop-
erly be said to have 'an interest in the profits, as profits?' When also may it
properly be said, that 'the interest in the profits is mutual,' and that 'each
person has a specific interest in the profits, as aprincioal trader?'
55. In connection with I.R.C. § 707(a) s treatment of transactions by a partner "other
than in his capacity as a member" of the partnership, see Weidner, Pratt and Deductionsfor
Payments to Partners, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 811, 834 (1977); Cowan, Compensating
the Promoter-General Partner, 22d WM. & MARY TAX CONF. 81, 83 n.6 (1977).
56. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3485.
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The Service and the courts have also strictly construed the exception
that permits limited partners to share in the nonrecourse liabilities of the
partnership in accordance with their profit sharing ratios. Curtis W
Kingbay57 illustrates that the form of nonrecourse financing, and not just
the substance, should be strictly adhered to. In Kingbay the amount of
partnership loss was clear. What was not clear was whether the limited
partners were entitled to claim their distributive shares of that loss. The
case involved the Regulation that states that limited partners only share in
partnership liabilities for basis purposes if the liabilities are fully nonre-
course. Curtis W. Kingbay and his wife were the limited partners in a
limited partnership in which the only general partner was Kingbay Proper-
ties, Inc., a corporation formed and wholly owned by Mr. Kingbay, and
into which he paid its total capital of $1,000. The corporation signed the
notes and mortgages to finance the purchase and construction of the part-
nership properties. The certificate of limited partnership reiterated the
status of Mr. and Mrs. Kingbay as limited partners by providing that at no
time should they be liable for any obligations or losses of the partnership
beyond the amount of their respective contributions.
The Kingbays could only report their distributive share of tax losses if
they could "up their basis" in their partnership interests by sharing in the*
partnership liabilities. The requirement that the liabilities be nonrecourse
was the obstacle. They argued that, in economic reality, the loans were
nonrecourse because they were taken out by their wholly owned, nomi-
nally capitalized, corporate general partner. The court rejected their argu-
ment:
[The Kingbays] cite no case authority for their contention and under
the facts here present we do not consider that the form in which the
transactions were set up should be ignored. Kingbay Properties, Inc.,
was a corporation incorporated for business purposes. [The
Kingbays'] contention amounts to disregarding the corporation as an
entity separate from Curtis W. Kingbay. Only in unusual circum-
stances will a corporate entity be disregarded, particularly when it is
the person who formed the corporation for a legitimate business pur-
pose who seeks to have the corporate entity overlooked. 8
Finally, the Service may prevent a limited partner from sharing in an
alleged partnership "liability" for basis purposes by reclassifying the liabil-
ity as a contribution to capital. In 1964, the Tax Court declared that debt
versus equity distinctions, developed in the corporate context, would be
applied to partnerships:
57. 46 T.C. 147 (1966).
58. Id. at 153-54. In Rev. Rul. 77-125, 1977-1 C.B. 130, the Service ruled that limited
partners could not increase their bases in their partnership interests by any portion of a
nonrecourse loan that had been taken out by their limited partnership. Repayment of the
loan had been guaranteed by a corporation for which the limited partnership was actin$ as
an independent contractor, and the limited partnership's liability under the loan was limited
to the payments it received from the corporation. The Service ruled that the loan was a
liability of the corporation rather than a liability of the partnership. The partnership's
"only relation to the loan is its formal status as maker." Id. at 131.
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We. . . are concerned here with the question whether an advance
by a partner to his partnership creates a valid debtor-creditor relation-
ship. And, it is true. . . that the entire area of case law within which
we are concerned has developed over transactions involving stock-
holders and their corporations. Althou.&h we have not been able to
find. . . a case wherein a court has applied the aforementioned prin-
ciples to a situation involving an advance by a partner to his partner-
ship, we have likewise not been able to find . . . a case wherein a
court has refused to apply these principles to apartnership transac-
tion. Accordingly, we treat this case as one of first impression.59
On the basis of the facts involved, the court held that advances by a lim-
ited partner to his partnership constituted capital contributions and not
loans.
In 1972, the Service issued two rulings that reclassified "loans" to part-
nerships as capital contributions. Although both rulings are in the oil and
gas area, they are potentially of great significance in the real estate area.
In Revenue Ruling 72-1356" the limited partnership agreement provided
that the general partner could make nonrecourse loans to the partnership,
and also to limited partners for portions of their subscription in the limited
partnership. The Service ruled:
[A] nonrecourse 'loan' from the general partner to a limited partner or
to the partnership is a contribution to the capital of the partnership by
the general partner, rather than a loan, an daccordingly, the amount
thereof shaU be added to the basis of the partnership interest of the
general partner and not to the basis of the partnership interest of thefimited partner.6"
The Ruling contains no other facts that help explain the conclusion that
the loans to the partnership, as well as the loans to the limited partners,
were, as a matter of law, contributions to capital by the general partner.
Revenue Ruling 72-35062 went one step further because it deemed a
"loan" by someone who was not a partner to be a contribution to partner-
ship capital. It involved taxpayer B who entered into an agreement to
make a "loan" to an otherwise unrelated limited partnership. None of the
partners had any personal liability to repay the "loan," which was "se-
cured by the partnership's properties consisting of some unproven leases
and some expensive but virtually unsalvageable oil and gas well installa-
tions." B had the right to convert the "loan" and receive in exchange a
twenty-five percent interest in the partnership's profits. The Service ruled:
[T]he so-called 'loan' is not a bona-fide debt but is, in reality, capital
placed at the risk of the venture by B. Therefore, the funds advanced
represents [sic] B's equity interest in the venture and the amount of
the advance constitutes the basis to B for such interest. Thus, the
bases of the partnership interests of the other parties . . . are not af-
fected.63
59. Joseph W. Hambuechen, 43 T.C. 90, 100 (1964).
60. 1972-1 C.B. 200.
61. Id. at 200.
62. 1972-2 C.B. 394.
63. Id. at 395.
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This Ruling seems to embrace the conclusion that, for tax purposes, B
became a partner as a matter of law.64
V. THE PATH OF TAX REFORM
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976,65 the primary focus of tax reform
in the real estate area was on the depreciation deduction and the use of
accelerated methods of computing depreciation. Owners of property used
in a trade or business or held for the production of income are allowed
annual depreciation deductions for the exhaustion, wear and tear of such
property.66 The straight line method of computing depreciation allocates
equal deductions over each year of the estimated useful life of the prop-
erty. Accelerated depreciation methods, however, allow the taxpayer
much greater depreciation deductions in the earlier years of the property's
useful life, and smaller deductions in later years. The use of accelerated
depreciation deductions to shelter income from other sources was felt to be
particularly offensive because the accelerated depreciation claimed often
grossly exceeded the actual deterioration, if any, that had taken place.67
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1964,68 a taxpayer "paid the piper" for the
depreciation deductions taken only insofar as those deductions were sub-
tracted from his basis in the property. Because gain on the sale of prop-
erty is calculated as sale price less adjusted basis, the amount of gain is
increased by the amount of the depreciation deductions taken. This, how-
ever, does not negate the benefit obtained by using the depreciation deduc-
tion to shelter ordinary income from other sources, because the gain is
postponed until sale and is generally taxed at favorable capital gains rates.
Thus, both tax deferral and tax conversion are achieved.
An example of the classic pre-1964 Act shelter illustrates the point. As-
sume that a taxpayer in the sixty percent bracket reported a depreciation
deduction of $10,000. This resulted in a tax savings of $6,000 in the year of
the deduction. The amount of the depreciation deduction that had been
taken was subtracted from his basis in the property. Thus, when he sold
the property, the gain he recognized was $10,000 greater than it would
have been had there been no depreciation deduction taken. This gain,
however, received capital gains treatment. In a year in which the maxi-
64. See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1972); Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261.
65. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 [hereinafter referred to
as the "1976 Act"].
66. I.R.C. § 167(a). There are two basic types of depreciable property, § 1245 property
and § 1250 property. Section 1245 property is depreciable tangible personal property and
includes elevators and escalators. Id. § 1245(a)(3). Section 1250 property is depreciable
real property, that is, buildings and their structural components, but not elevators and esca-
lators. Id. § 1250(c). The distinction is important because each is subject to its own rules
concerning the availability of accelerated depreciation methods and depreciation recapture.
67. Straight line depreciation often grossly overstates economic depreciation. For ex-
ample, a classic study in this area concludes that, on average, the decline in the market value
of apartment houses from 1951 to 1965 was negligible. TAUBMAN & RASCHE, TAX INCEN-
TIVES 113-142 (1971).




mum tax on capital gains was twenty-five percent, the tax bill on the addi-
tional $10,000 gain was only $2,500. Thus, taxpayer, in effect, "bought" a
$6,000 tax saving in the year in which he took his depreciation deduction,
for only $2,500, which he did not have to pay until the sale of the property.
The 1964 Act was the first legislation to require that part or all of the gain
on the sale of property that had been depreciated at an accelerated rate be
"recaptured," that is, taxed as ordinary income. It was not until the 1976
Act that Congress specifically focused on the inclusion of nonrecourse lia-
bilities in depreciable basis.
A. The Tax Reform Act of 1969
The Tax Reform Act of 196969 was a continuation of the confinement of
real estate tax shelters that began with the initial recapture provision in the
1964 Act. The basic thrust of the 1969 Act with regard to real estate tax
shelters was threefold: (1) restrict the use of accelerated depreciation meth-
ods that permit taxpayers to take larger depreciation deductions in the ear-
lier years of the property's useful life rather than spread them evenly over
the useful life; (2) strengthen the 1964 Act provisions that treat some of the
gain on sale as ordinary income when accelerated methods of computing
depreciation have been used; and (3) include accelerated depreciation and
one half of net capital gains in with certain other items of "preference"
subject to a new ten percent tax.
Limitation on the Availability of Accelerated Depreciation Methods. The
general rule of the 1969 Act with respect to depreciation of real property7"
is that new property may be depreciated only by the 150% declining bal-
ance or straight line methods,71 and used property may be depreciated
only by the straight line method.72 The most important exceptions to this
general rule apply to residential rental property and to rehabilitation ex-
penditures on low income rental housing. Urban riots had left legislators
more susceptible to incentives to develop and refurbish rental housing.
With respect to new residential rental properties, all accelerated deprecia-
tion methods previously available remained available. Therefore, new
residential rental properties may still be depreciated according to the very
rapid 200% declining balance or sum-of-the-year-digits methods.73 With
respect to used residential rental property, only the straight line method is
preserved, unless the property has a useful life of twenty years or more, in
which case the 125% declining balance method is still available.7" With
69. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 [hereinafter referred to as
the "1969 Act"].
70. The 1969 Act did not place any limitations on the use of accelerated methods to
depreciate new personal property, which can be depreciated even by use of the very rapid
double declining balance or sum-of-the-years digits methods. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-0(b)
(1960).
71. I.R.C. § 167(j)(1)(B).
72. Id. § 1670)(4).
73. Id. § 1678)(2).
74. Id. § 167 )(5).
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respect to certain rehabilitation expenditures on low income rental hous-
ing, the taxpayer may elect to depreciate such expenditures by the straight
line method over a sixty-month period.75 Under prior law, such expendi-
tures had to be capitalized and depreciated over the entire remaining use-
ful life of the property.
Recapture of Ordinary Income. The 1969 Act strengthened the "recap-
ture" provisions applied to real estate by the 1964 Act. The recapture rules
reduce the tax shelter benefits of accelerated depreciation by treating some
of the gain on the sale of property that has been depreciated at an acceler-
ated rate as ordinary income. The amount of depreciation "recaptured" is
determined by applying the appropriate "applicable percentage" to the
amount of depreciation that has been taken in excess of the amount that
would have been taken under the straight line method.76 Separate rules
are provided for determining the applicable percentages to be applied to
pre-1970 and post-1969 "excess" depreciation. The applicable percentage
imposed by the 1969 Act on pre-1970 excess depreciation is 100% less one
percent for each month the property is held beyond twenty months. Thus,
if the property is held for more than ten years, none of the pre-1970 excess
depreciation will be recaptured.
Generally, the applicable percentage on post-1969 excess depreciation of
real property is 100%. That is, all of the excess depreciation will be recap-
tured, regardless of the length of time the property is held.77 The 1969
Act, however, applied more lenient recapture provisions to residential
rental properties. With respect to such property, the applicable percent-
age was 100% less one percent for each month the property was held be-
yond 100 months. Thus, if a residential rental property were held for
more than sixteen years and eight months there was no recapture. With
respect to property financed under the National Housing Act or similar
programs and subject to certain limitations on the rate of return and profit,
the applicable percentage was the same as it would be for pre-1970 excess
depreciation, such that there is no recapture if the property is held for
more than ten years.
The Tax on Preferences. The 1969 Act imposed a new tax on items of
"tax preference," certain deductions not used by most taxpayers, but used
to great advantage by others.7' The tax was ten percent of the excess of
the year's preferences over the sum of $30,000 plus the taxpayer's regular
federal tax. "Excess depreciation," the depreciation taken in excess of the
amount of depreciation allowable under the straight line method, was
made an item of tax preference subject to this tax. Consequently, al-
75. Id. § 167(k).
76. In contrast, in the case of depreciable personal property, all depreciation is recap-
tured, to the extent of gain, at ordinary income rates. Id. §1245(a)(l).
77. The amount of depreciation recaptured is limited to the amount of ain. If, how-
ever, the real property, whether commercial or residential, is held 12 months or less, all
depreciation, not merely excess depreciation, will be recaptured. Id. § 1250(b)(1).
78. Id. § 57(a).
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though excess depreciation is not recaptured until the property is sold, it is
taxed as a preference item each year accelerated depreciation is taken.
Fuither, the minimum tax also applies not only to the accelerated depreci-
ation as it is taken each year,79 it also applies in the year of sale to one-half
of the net capital gain for the year.8"
B. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
From a real estate point of view, the 1976 Act may be more significant
for what the Congress chose not to do to real estate, rather than for what it
actually did. It chose, for example, not to subject real estate to the "at
risk" limitation it applied to other tax shelters. Nevertheless, the 1976 Act
did include several significant changes that restrict real estate tax shelters.
Strengthened Recapture Provisions. The 1976 Act left intact the 1969 Act
rules that limit the availability of accelerated depreciation methods.8
The 1976 Act, however, provides for greater depreciation recapture than
did the 1969 Act. There is no change with respect to commercial proper-
ties; as under the 1969 Act, all excess depreciation will be recaptured.82
The 1976 Act, however, extends this rule of 100% recapture to all residen-
tial rental housing other than assisted housing.83 Congress learned that
the preferred treatment it had given broadly to all residential rental hous-
ing would not necessarily result in the reconstruction of the inner cities or,
indeed, in the construction of much low-income housing anywhere. Thus,
the incentive was confined more narrowly to government assisted low and
moderate income housing projects. In the case of assisted housing, the
amount of excess depreciation subject to recapture is 100% less 1% for each
79. Id. § 57(a)(2).
80. Id. § 57(a)(9)(A).
81. Note that property may be depreciated under either the composite method or the
component method. Under the composite method, a group of assets is lumped together and
depreciated as a unit. For example, all the parts of a building can be depreciated by apply-
ing a single rate to the unit. The rate is essentially a weighted average. It is equal to the
sum of the annual depreciation deductions allowable for each component, divided by the
total cost of the components. The taxpayer may so calculate the composite rate if he is able
to establish the useful life and cost of each component. As an alternative, the taxpayer may
use the guideline composite life provided by the CLADR system to determine the composite
rate. See Dailey & Gaffney, Anatomy of a Real Estate Tax Shelter.- The Tax Reform
Scalpel, 55 TAXES 127, 131-32 (1977).
Component depreciation involves separate depreciation of each structural component.
The effective useful life produced under the component method is generally shorter than the
guideline composite life. Id, It will thus tend to produce larger deductions in the earlier
years of ownership. Another substantial benefit of the component method is that there are
no limitations placed on the use of accelerated depreciation methods on a component that
might qualify as § 1245 property. For example, composite depreciation of a new commer-
cial building, including its structural components, may be written off no faster than accord-
ing to the 150% decling balance method. However, under component depreciation,
components such as elevators and escalators, both § 1245 property, may be depreciated ac-
cording to the 200% declining balance method. I.R.C. § 167(j)(1). See Tidwell, Component
Depreciation Can Be a "Cure"for Excess Depreciation, 55 TAXES 116 (1977).
82. I.R.C. § 1250(a)(l)(B)(v).
83. Id. (with respect to depreciation attributable to periods after Dec. 31, 1975). The
1976 Act also provided that, when real property is disposed of by foreclosure, the holding
period for purposes of determining the amount of depreciation recaptured terminates when
the foreclosure proceedings begin. Id. § 1250(d)(10).
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month the property is held after its first eight years and four months in
service.84
Capitalization of Construction Period Items. The 1976 Act contains sev-
eral provisions to prevent the real estate industry from currently deducting
items of a capital nature. The most significant of these provisions is the
completely new section 189. Prior to the 1976 Act, interest and taxes in-
curred during the construction period were deducted immediately rather
than capitalized and written off over the life of the improvement. When
fully phased in, section 189 will require construction period interest and
taxes to be capitalized and written off on a straight line basis over a ten-
year period.85 The section applies to individuals, Subchapter S corpora-
tions, and personal holding companies. The first write-off year is that in
which the expenses are paid or accrued, depending on the taxpayer's
method of accounting; the second write-off year is the first year in which
the property is placed in service; and each year thereafter is a write-off
year until expiration.86 Intervening construction period years are skipped;
thus, the ten-year amortization period may not be consecutive.
The 1976 Act also made two changes to the partnership provisions to
prevent partners from currently deducting capital outlays. First, it intro-
duced a completely new section 709, which requires the capitalization of
partnership organization and syndication fees, but permits them to be writ-
ten off on a straight line basis over a five-year period.87 Second, section
707(c), the provision that permits a partnership to claim a deduction for
"guaranteed payments" it makes to its partners, was amended to empha-
size that section 707(c) does not authorize partnerships to currently deduct
items that would have to be capitalized had they been made to nonpart-
ners.
88
The Minimum Tax on Preferences. The minimum tax on preferences in-
troduced by the 1969 Act proved to be an insignificant revenue raiser.89
84. Id. §§ 1250(a)(l)(B)(i)-(iv).
85. Id. § 189(b) contains separate transitional rules for nonresidential real estate, resi-
dential real estate, and government subsidized housing.
86. Id. § 189(c)(1).
87. Id. § 709(b)(1).
88. There were those in the industry who had argued that § 707(c) authorized current
deductions for payments that would have to be capitalized if made to nonpartners. This
contention was laid to rest in Cagle v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 86 (1974). Seealso Rev. Rul.
75-214, 1975-1 C.B. 185. Thus, the 1976 Act's change to § 707(c) was merely a clarification.
For a discussion of § 707(c), see Weidner, supra note 55.
89. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3439, 3544, states:
The existing minimum tax on tax preferences was enacted in 1969 in order
to ensure that-high-income individuals and corporations pay at least a mini-
mum rate of tax on their tax preferences, including both exclusions from taxa-
ble income and deferrals of tax liability into future years. The current
minimum tax, however, has not achieved this goal. High-income individuals
still are able to avoid paying income tax, and in 1974 the minimum tax on
individuals raised only $130 million, a small fraction of tax-preferred income.
Moreover, the existing minimum tax is largely a tax on only one type of pre-
ferred income-the excluded half of long-term capital gains, which constitutes
about seven-eighths of the income in the minimum tax base.
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In response, the 1976 Act included a general tightening of the minimum
tax on preferences. The rate was increased from ten to fifteen percent and
the exemption for tax preferences was reduced from $30,000 plus regular
taxes paid, to the greater of $10,000 or one-half of regular taxes paid in the
case of individuals. These changes in the minimum tax rules also affected
the maximum tax rules on earned income because tax preference income
reduces the amount that would otherwise qualify as earned income eligible
for the fifty percent maximum rate.90
Prepaid Interest. The Code contains a broadly worded interest deduc-
tion, which provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest
paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."91 In 1945, the
Service ruled that it was permissible for taxpayers who computed their
income using a cash method of accounting to deduct up to five years of
prepaid interest in the year of payment.9 z Consequently, prepayments of
interest in real estate transactions became as common as mortgages. In
1968, the Service revoked the earlier ruling "[i]n view of certain abuses." 93
It relied on its statutory authority to require a taxpayer to use a different
method of accounting if the method he chooses for himself "does not
clearly reflect income,"94 and ruled that the prepayment of more than one
year's interest by a cash method taxpayer "will be considered as materially
distorting income. 9 5 Hence, the taxpayer making such a payment is re-
quired to report it on an accrual method of accounting, and postpone de-
duction until the year to which the interest is chargeable. The Ruling
further declared that any prepayment for one year or less will be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a material distortion of
income has resulted.96 The 1968 Ruling's dramatic change of position
was controversial, particularly because of its automatic disqualification of
all prepayments for more than a twelve-month period.
The 1976 Act put to rest any controversy about the 1968 Ruling by in-
troducing section 461(g),97 which eliminated deductions for prepaid inter-
90. I.R.C. § 1348(b)(2)(B).
91. Id. § 163(a).
92. I.T. 3740, 1945 C.B. 109.
93. Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76, 77.
94. Id. (discussing I.R.C. § 446(b)).
95. 1968-2 C.B. at 77.
96. Rev. Rul. 77-304, 1977-35 I.R.B. 9, applies Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76, at the
partnership level.
97. I.R.C. § 461(g) provides:
(g) Prepaid Interest.-
(1) In general.-If the taxable income of the taxpayer is computed under
the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, interest paid by the
taxpayer which, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, is properly al-
lcable to any period-
(A) with respect to which the interest represents a charge for the use or
forbearance of money, and
(B) which is after the close of the taxable year in which paid, shall be
charged to capital account and shall be treated as paid in the period to
which so allocable.
(2) Exception.-This subsection shall not apply to points paid in respect
of any indebtedness incurred in connection with the purchase or improve-
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est. The legislative history of the section makes clear that the material
distortion of income principle is no longer to control the reporting of inter-
est deductions; cash method taxpayers must simply report interest pay-
ments as would an accrual method taxpayer.98 The legislative history also
makes clear that previous law continues to control the definition of inter-
est. Thus, the Service may continue to argue that payments denominated
"interest" constitute something other than interest, such as a deposit, a
portion of principal, or a payment for an option.99 The Service can be
expected to be particularly aggressive with respect to claims of "interest"
deductions in wraparound mortgage situations.' °°
ment of, and secured by, the principal residence of the taxpayer to the ex-
tent that, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, such payment of
points is an established business practice in the area in which such indebted-
ness is incurred, and the amount of such payment does not exceed the
amount generally charged in such area.
98. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 104, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3439, 3540, to accompany H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1976), provides:
In determining whether an interest prepayment is properly allocable to one or
more taxable years after the year of payment, the committee intends that the
allocation be made to the period or periods in which the interest represents a
cost of using the borrowed money in that period, regardless of whether al-
lowing prepaid interest to be deducted when paid would materially distort the
taxpayer's income in the year of payment (or the income of a partnership of
which the taxpayer may be a member).
[This rule] is intended to conform the tax deductibility of prepaid interest by
cash method taxpayers to the rule which the committee understands to be
proper under present law for interest prepayments by an accrual method tax-
payer.
The M6 Act also made certain changes to the limitation on deductions for interest in-
curred to purchase or carry "property held for investment," I.R.C. § 163(d), which was intro-
duced by the Tax Reform Act of,1969. Real property subject to a net lease will be classified
as "property held for investment" for this purpose if it falls within id. §§ 163(d)(4)(A)(i) or
(ii). The 1976 Act limits the deduction for interest on investment indebtedness to $10,000
per year plus the taxpayer's net investment income. Id. § 163(d)(1).
99. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 n.7, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3439, 3540 n.7, states:
The committee does not intend to prevent the Treasury or the taxpayer
from continuing (where appropriate) to characterize a purported 'interest'
payment as not true interest in the particular circumstances. It may thus be
appropriate in some cases to treat a payment denominated 'interest' as, in sub-
stance, additional purchase price of property, as a dividend, as payment for an
option, etc.
100. See the discussion of Collins v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1656 (1970), at text accom-
panying notes 136-42 infra, in which the Tax Court recharacterized "interest" payments
claimed under a wraparound mortgage as part of the purchase price. Congress was clearly
hostile to the use of wraparound mortgages to accelerate interest deductions:
A recent technique used to justify larger amounts of prepaid interest within
the Service's present guidelines than can be obtained under conventional fi-
nancing is the 'wraparound' mortgage (sometimes referred to as an all-inclu-
sive deed of trust). Often, a . . . property which investors are purchasing is
encumbered by an existing first mortgage. The investors execute to the seller
a new purchase money obligation whose face amount includes both the un-
paid balance of the first mortgage and the new financing supplied by the seller
which would ordinarily take the form of a second mortgage). The buyers
agree to pay (and to prepay) interest on the face amount of the 'wraparound'
note, while the seller agrees to continue paying the interest on the first mort-
gage out of the interest payments which he receives from the buyers. Since a
wraparound mortgage usually bears a higher rate of interest than the first
mortgage (and in some cases the additional prepaid interest which the buyers
claim on the note is negotiated as a substitute for a larger down payment), this
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Bonus Depreciation. Under section 179, when a partnership acquired
tangible personal property with a useful life of six years or more,' 0 ' it
could elect to claim, in addition to regular depreciation, an extra deprecia-
tion allowance of twenty percent of the cost of such property up to $2,000
per partner. 0 2 Prior to the 1976 Act, the dollar limitation was applied to
each partner, and not to the partnership as an entity. The 1976 Act ap-
plies the $2,000 limit on bonus depreciation 0 3 at both the partnership level
and with respect to each partner.'°4
Partnership Allocations. A principal advantage of the partnership form is
that it offers partners a great deal of flexibility to allocate among them-
selves the economic and tax consequences of their venture. In real estate
partnerships, including limited partnerships, this flexibility has long been
availed of, and pushed to its limit, to allocate particular deductions and
overall partnership tax losses to the partners most in need of offsets against
their income from other sources. In response, the 1976 Act completely
rewrote the rules that govern partnership allocations.
The basic rules of partnership allocations can be stated simply. In gen-
eral, partners are free to determine in their partnership agreement how the
various economic and tax consequences of partnership operations will be
allocated.' 5 The partnership agreement includes any amendments made
up until the deadline for filing the partnership return. 0 6 Prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, allocations in the partnership agreement were
respected unless they were for the "principal purpose" of tax avoidance or
evasion. Allocations that violated the principal purpose limitation were
disregarded and reallocated according to the partners' ratio for sharing the
"taxable income or loss of the partnership, as described in section
702(a)(9)."'1 7 The 1976 Act makes several changes to the rules governing
type of arrangement has been widely used to increase the amount of interest
which can be prepaid in the initial year of a purchase of property and claimed
as a deduction for one year's prepaid interest within the Service's present
guidelines.
S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 102-03, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3439, 3538-39.
In appropriate cases. . . the committee does not intend to prevent the Service
from recharacterizing part or all of a buyer's (or borrower's) 'interest' payment
on a wraparound mortgage as, in substance, an additional down payment of
principal or as a nondeductible deposit of interest with a third party. See
Rev. Rul. 75-99, 1975-1 C.B. 197.
S. REP. No. 938 at 105, n.9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3541 n.9.
101. I.R.C. § 179(d)(1)(C).
102. Id. § 179(a). In determining whether property qualifies for bonus depreciation, the
distinction is between tangible personal property and real property, and not between § 1245
property and § 1250 property. In most cases, § 1245 property is tangible personal property,
and§ 1250 property is real property. Thore are, however, cases in which§ 1245 property is
not personal property, for example, elevators and escalators.
103. I.R.C. § 179(b).
104. Id. § 179(d)(8).
105. Id. § 704(a).
106. Id. § 761(c).
107. Id. § 704(b) (amended 1976) provided:
(b) Distributive Share Determined by Income or Loss Ratio.-A partner's
distributive share of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall
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partnership allocations. Most basically, it removes the last two rules just
quoted. It replaces the "principal purpose" limitation with the require-
ment that allocations have "substantial economic effect."° 8 Further, allo-
cations that lack substantial economic effect will now be reallocated
according to each partner's "interest in the partnership (determined by tak-
ing into account all facts and circumstances)."' 0 9
It is not clear whether the 1976 Act made any change in substance by
replacing the "principal purpose" limitation with the requirement that al-
locations must have "substantial economic effect."' 10 There are two basic
reasons for skepticism. First, it was generally assumed that the essential
test for determining whether an allocation satisfied the principal purpose
limitation was whether it had substantial economic effect. Second, the
legislative history of the 1976 Act contains numerous references to existing
law to determine what constitutes substantial economic effect."'I
The fundamental purpose of the new section 704(b) is to make clear that
bottom line allocations of taxable income or loss are subject to the same
limitations as allocations of individual items. The new provision changes
two features of section 704(b) that had in the past supported arguments
that bottom line allocations could not be disregarded. First, the old prin-
cipal purpose limitation, by its terms, applied to allocations of any "item."
It had been argued that the partnership's bottom line was not subject to the
principal purpose limitation because it was a "composite" rather than an
"item." New section 704(b) makes it inescapable that the new substantial
economic effect requirement applies to allocations of composites because it
includes in every subsection the disjunctive parenthetical "(or item
thereof)."" 2  Second, it had been argued that it would be pointless for the
be determined in accordance with his distributive share of taxable income or
loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(a)(9), for the taxable year,
if-
(1) the partnership agreement does not provide as to the partner's dis-
tributive share of such item, or
(2) the principal purpose of any provision in the partnership agreement
with respect to the partner's distributive share of such item is the avoidance
or evasion of any tax imposed by this subtitle.
108. Id. §§ 704(a), (0).
109. The new I.R.C. § 704(b) provides as follows:(b) Determination of Distributive Share.-A partner's distributive share
of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof) shall be determined
in accordance with the partner's interest in the partnership (determined by
taking into account all facts and circumstances), if-(1) the partnership agreement does not provide as to the partner's dis-
tributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof),
or
(2) the allocation to a partner under the agreement of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit (or item thereof) does not have substantial economic
effect.
110. See Weidner, Partnershi Allocations and Tax Reform, 5 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1 (1977),
for a discussion of partnership allocations before and after the 1976 Act.
11. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 n.7, reprinted n [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3535-36, stating: "[T]he committee believes that allocations
of special items and overall allocations should be restricted to those situations where the
allocations have substantial economic effect, as presently interpreted by the regulations and
case law."
112. I.R.C. § 704(b).
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Service to disregard an allocation of taxable income or loss only to subject
it to the reallocation mechanism of "taxable income or loss of the partner-
ship, as described in section 702(a)(9)." ' 3  The new reallocation mecha-
nism of "the partner's interest in the partnership (determined by taking
into account all facts and circumstances)""' 4 applies as easily to bottom
line allocations as it does to allocations of individual items.
The 1976 Act also provided against retroactive allocations. The term
"retroactive allocation" has been used in a broad sense to refer to ratios
established to allocate items of income or loss previously accrued. A ret-
roactive allocation in this broad sense is present if, for example, partners
wait until the end of the year to decide how to divide the results of the
year's operations. The term, however, is more commonly used in a much
narrower sense to identify allocations to new partners of gain or loss that
was incurred prior to their admission. The retroactivity that is at issue is
not that of the partnership allocation provision itself. The issue is whether
a new partner may share in tax consequences incurred prior to his admis-
sion. Thus, the retroactivity issue is present even if there is no amendment
to the partnership agreement. For example, some partnership agreements
allocate taxable income or loss in accordance with the partners' capital
accounts at the close of the year. Although the allocation provision itself
remains unchanged, its effect is to allocate preadmission gain or loss to
partners admitted late in the year. The issue became extremely controver-
sial because tax shelter partnerships frequently admitted limited partners
at the end of the year and allocated losses to them as if they had been
members for the entire year. The 1976 Act clearly limits a new partner to
tax benefits for the portion of the year he was a member of the partner-
ship. 1 5
What the 1976 Act Did Not Do. Prior to the passage of the 1976 Act,
Congress was acutely aware of the prevalence of limited partnerships to
offer high bracket investors tax losses in amounts far in excess of their
actual cash investments. It knew that such tax shelters existed in many
different industries, including real estate, oil and gas, motion pictures,
farming, and leasing. When the 1976 Act was before the House, it con-
tained a proposal referred to as "LAL," the limitation on artificial ac-
113. Id. § 704(b) (amended 1976).
114. Id. § 704(b).
115. Id. § 706(c)(2)(B). The legislative history indicates that partners are to be given
substantial leeway to compute the required proration:
In determining the income, loss or special item allocable to an incoming part-
ner, the partnership will either allocate on a daily basis or separate the part-
nership year into two (or more) segments and allocate income, loss or special
items in each segment among the persons who were partners during that seg-
ment.
HOUSE COMMIl-rEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT
ON THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976). Partners are
to have the same flexibility to compute proration that they have under the existing Regula-
tions concerning the sale by a partner of his entire interest in the partnership. S. REP. No.
938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 98, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3534.




counting losses. LAL provided that certain accelerated deductions could
only be used to offset related income. The Senate, however, rejected LAL
and instead introduced the "at risk" provisions that were ultimately en-
acted.
Although the 1976 Act did introduce the concept that the tax losses an
investor may claim from certain activities should be limited to the amount
he has "at risk" in those activities, real estate partnerships were exempted.
Stated somewhat loosely, as to those activities covered by the new at risk
rules, the 1976 Act repeals Crane. Two separate at risk provisions were
inserted in the Code by the 1976 Act. Section 46516 is entirely new and
applies to only four specific types of tax shelters: motion picture films and
video tapes; farming; equipment leasing; and oil and gas. Section
704(d)" 7 was amended to include a catchall provision that applies broadly
to all partnerships, but specifically exempts real estate partnerships.'8
Under each of these rules, the taxpayer is only considered to have placed
amounts at risk in an activity to the extent of the amount of money he has
contributed, plus the adjusted basis of any property he has contributed,
plus the amount of any loans for the activity for which he is personally
liable. A taxpayer will not be considered to be at risk with respect to
nonrecourse financing, or with respect to other amounts protected against
loss by guarantees, stop-loss agreements, or other similar arrangements.
In addition to exempting real estate from the at risk limitations," 9 Con-
gress also declined to amend the rules that permit limited partner-
ships, including limited partnerships that have no general partner other
than a corporation, to be classified for tax purposes as partnerships rather
116. I.R.C. § 465.
117. Id. § 704(d).
118. H.R. 13511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 201(b)(1) (1978), reported by the House Ways
and Means Committee on August 4, 1978, would repeal the "at risk" rule in I.R.C. § 704(d),
and § 201(a) would expand the "at risk" rule of I.R.C. § 465 to embrace all activities other
than "the holding of real property." The House Ways and Means Committee Report ex-
plains the need for the change as follows:
The at risk rules of present law impose a significant limitation on many
types of tax shelters. However, the rules do not cover three types of situations
where the use of tax shelters should be further restricted. First, except in case
of the four types of activities specified in section 465, the at risk rules do not
apply to direct investments. Second, the at risk rules do not apply to many
types of closely held corporations which may use tax shelters. Third, the cur-
rent at risk provisions fail to adequately deal with situations where a taxpayer
receives distributions (or otherwise reduces his original at risk basis through
debt guarantees, conversion of debt from recourse to nonrecourse, etc.) after
having used his at risk basis to support losses in a prior year.
Except for the four activities to which the specific at risk applies, neither of
the at risk rules applies to direct investments (i.e., investments made directly,
not through partnerships). Essentially, the committee believes that the lack of
any application of the at risk principles to direct investments constitutes a ma-
jor gap in the tax law in dealing with tax shelter abuses.
Thus, the bill provides a revised at risk rule which would apply to all invest-
ments (direct or indirect) in all activities except real estate.
H. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, to accompany H.R. 13511, Revenue Act of 1978.
119. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3439, 3545, provides:
Many so-called tax shelter investments, however, do have economic merit,
and elimination of the tax benefits for such investments could cause a signifi-
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than as corporations.' 2°
VI. THE SERVICE AND THE COURTS
A. The Requirement of Economic Purpose
Independent of congressional "reform," the Service and the courts con-
tinue to strike out at arrangements they consider particularly abusive.
The courts have at their disposal the principle that tax benefits can be
derived from allegedly profit-oriented transactions only if those transac-
tions represent "purposive economic activity," that is, if there exists a rea-
sonable expectation of economic profit. It is important to understand the
pervasiveness of this principle, which the Service has successfully used to
invalidate particular details of transactions that, overall, have economic
substance.
Gregory v. Helveringl2' is generally considered the classic Supreme
Court statement that tax benefits will not be denied simply because they
motivated a transaction. The Gregory Court, however, further held that
the absence of a business purpose will result in the denial of the tax bene-
fits of Code provisions premised on commercial transactions.' 22 In addi-
tion to the commercial transaction provision cases, there is a further line of
cant decline in economic activity. This is especially true of two extremely
risky industries-real estate and oil and gas drilling. In both of these indus-
tries, the committee concluded it would be undesirable to make tax changes
that would cause major declines in investment.
Although oil and gas drilling ventures are subject to the "at risk" limitation of IR.C. § 465,
the limitation is not nearly as serious as it is to the other tax shelters covered. Nonrecourse
financing has not been as critical in the oil and gas area as it has been in other areas.
120. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), held that the Service is bound by the
present classification regulations, which are extremely biased toward classifying as a part-
nership for tax purposes anything that is a general or a limited partnership under local law.
See a so Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975). The opinions in Larson
repeatedly invited the Treasury Department to propose new regulations more evenly bal-
anced between corporate and partnership classification. On January 5, 1977, the Treasury
accepted the invitation by pubihin osed new regulations less biased toward partner-
ship classification. Within hours of their publication, they were withdrawn. Battle is
Joined on IRS Partnershp-Corporation Ruling, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1977, at A 11, col. 3.
121. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). The taxpayer in Gregory wanted stock held by her corpora.tion transferred to her without having the distribution taxed as a dividend. In an attempt to
avail herself of the nonrecognition of gain provisions applicable to a corporate reorganiza-tion, she created a third corporation, transferred the shares to it, and immediately caused it
to be dissolved and to distribute the shares to her. The Court said the transaction would notbe disrejgarded simply because its ulterior purpose was to escape payment of a tax. ThetransacUon was taxed as a dividend because the corporation created and immediately dis-
solved had "no business or corporate purpose" but was a "contrivance" set up "not to reor-
anize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the
[taxpayer]." Id.at 4t69.
122. For a collection and discussion of the cases, see Young, The Role of Motive in Evalu-
ating Tax Sheltered Investments, 22 Tx LAW. 275 (1969). In Commissioner v. Transport
Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955(1950), udge Learned Hand stressed that Gregory is not to be confined to corporate reorga-
nizations:It has a much wider scope; it means that in construing words of a tax statute
which describe commercial or industrial transactions we are to understandthem to refer to transactions entered upon for commercial and industrial pur-
poses and not to include transactions entered upon for no other motive but to
escape taxation.
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cases that disallows interest deductions in a variety of tax avoidance
schemes. These cases constitute the most striking example of the require-
ment of profit-making activity because the interest deduction is not pre-
mised on a commercial transaction.123  The interest deduction is available
for "all interest paid. . . on indebtedness," 24 even if the loan is taken out
for purely personal pleasure.
Knetsch v. United States 25 is the leading Supreme Court decision on the
interest deduction. The case concerned an arrangement under which the
taxpayer borrowed from an annuity company at 3-1/2% interest to
purchase deferred annuity contracts that would yield 2-1/2%, then prepaid
the interest. 26  The Court said that under Gregory it was irrelevant that
the taxpayer entered the transaction only to secure interest deductions. 127
Nevertheless, it held that no indebtedness had been created for tax pur-
poses because the transaction was a sham that offered the taxpayer "noth-
ing of substance" beyond an interest deduction. The borrowing on the
annuity policy rendered its net cash value negligible. Knetsch left unclear
whether the reason the interest deductions were disallowed was that no
genuine indebtedness had been created under local law, or whether the
reason was that a genuine indebtedness under local law served no function
other than to generate interest deductions. 28  In other words, the Court
left unclear whether it considered the transaction a sham because the legal
relationships purportedly created were found not to exist, or because those
relationships existed for no other reason than tax avoidance.
In Goldstein v. Commissioner'29 the Second Circuit stated unequivocally
123. Some Code provisions specifically deny tax advantages to arrangements undertaken
for particular motives or purposes. Other provisions, although not explicitly referring to
motive or purpose, premise the availability of a tax advantage on activity of a particular
character. Depreciation deductions, for example, are available only with respect to prop-
erty used in a trade or business or held for the production of income. Finally, there are
provisions that on their face allow tax advantage independent of motive, purpose, or charac-
ter of transaction. The interest deduction is a prime example.
124. I.R.C. § 163(a).
125. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
126. The transaction was far more complicated. The basic point is that there was no
possibility of economic gain.
127. A variant on the scheme used in Knetsch was to involve a third party lender, usually
a bank. In Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908
(1960), the taxpayer purchased an annual premium annuity policy and paid the first pre-
mium. Thereafter, he borrowed to increase the policy's cash or loan value, then borrowed
the increase in value to pay off the loan taken out to create that value, and claimed interest
deductions for payments made on the loans on the policy. The taxpayer borrowed at 4% to
obtain a discount of less than 3% for prepayment, immediately recouping most of the alleged
prepayments of interest by borrowing on the increase in cash surrender value created by the
payments. The Third Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that the only purpose of the trans-
actions was the creation of interest deductions, and emphasized that the mere fact that
"there may be an obligation which is valid under local law is not determinative of whether
there is a true indebtedness within the meaning of [section 163]." 270 F.2d at 298.
128. The latter seems to be the correct interpretation. See Blum, Knetsch v. United
States. A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 135, 149. The incorpora-
tion of this vague standard into the interest deduction was resisted by the three dissenting
Justices who protested that the majority had disallowed Knetsch's deduction "because the
annuity device was devoid of commercial substance." 364 U.S. at 371 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
129. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
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that interest on an enforceable indebtedness is not deductible if it does not
involve "purposive economic activity." In the year in which she won the
Irish Sweepstakes, Mrs. Goldstein took out two loans to purchase short-
term Treasury bills, which she pledged as collateral to secure the loans.
She then prepaid the interest that would accrue on the loans should they
remain outstanding until maturity. It was highly unlikely that the market
for Treasury bills would fluctuate rapidly enough for Mrs. Goldstein to
reasonably expect any economic profit from the transaction.
The Tax Court said the transactions were shams because they created no
genuine indebtedness. The Second Circuit disagreed, finding that the
"loan arrangements were . . . regular and, moreover, indistinguishable
from any other legitimate loan transaction contracted for the purchase of
Government securities."' 3° Nevertheless, it disallowed the interest deduc-
tions, concluding that the transactions were structured "without any realis-
tic expectation of economic profit and solely in order to secure a large
interest deduction,""'3 and that tax consequences alone were insufficient to
support an interest deduction. The court based its holding on the underly-
ing purpose of the interest deduction, which it deemed to be a "Congres-
sional policy of encouraging purposive activity to be financed through
borrowing." '32 This policy would be frustrated if deductions were al-
lowed "for interest paid on funds borrowed for no purposive reason, other
than the securing of a deduction."' 33 Transactions should not be en-
couraged "that have no economic utility and that would not be engaged in
but for the system of taxes imposed by Congress."' 134 Because the court
found "no prospect" of economic profit, the case does not specify the
probability of eventual profit necessary to prevent a finding of nonpurpo-
sive activity. Cases since Goldstein have indicated that the purposive ac-
tivity requirement is not satisfied by a profit that could not reasonably
have been anticipated at the inception of the transaction.
135
James,4. Collins136 is perhaps the most striking application of Goldstein
to a real estate transaction. The case is significant because the Tax Court
relied on Goldstein to invalidate one feature of a transaction that overall
had as much economic substance as a real estate transaction could have.
Mr. Collins won the Irish Sweepstakes in 1962. He was approached by a
130. Id. at 737.
131. Id. at 740.
132. Id. at 741.
133. Id. at 742.
134. Id. The Second Circuit admitted that the underlying purpose of the interest deduc-
tion "is difficult to articulate because this provision is extremely broad: there is no require-
ment that deductible interest serve a business purpose, that it be ordinary and necessary, or
even that it be reasonable." Id. at 741.
135. In Estate of Frank Cohen, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1221 (1970), the "reasonable expecta-
tion of economic profit" requirement was applied to disallow interest deductions in a trans-
action that actually produced a profit potential. The court said that "the transaction per se
was of sufficient substance to avert a finding of sham," Id. at 1227, but disallowed the
deduction on the ground that the taxpayer "could not have reasonably expected the transac-
tion to have an appreciable effect on his beneficial interest." Id. at 1228 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
136. 54 T.C. 1656 (1970).
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real estate broker who wanted to sell him income producing property.
Collins signed a contract to purchase a one-year-old apartment building.
The initial contract was signed by Collins on November 12, 1962, and con-
tained the following terms:
(1) Purchase price: $168,000
(2) Downpayment: $63,000
(3) "Subject to" existing mortgage of $105,000 which:
(a) bore interest at the rate of 7.2%;
(b) required monthly debt service of $827;
(c) had an approximate maturity of twenty years.
(4) Transaction must be closed by December 31, 1962.
After this initial contract was signed, its provisions were reworked by an
attorney and an accountant, both working for Collins. The amended and
final contract was signed by both buyer and seller and recorded on De-
cember 12, 1962. It provided as follows:
(1) Purchase price: $158,000
(2) Downpayment: $19,315
(3) Balance: Note in the amount of $139,485 which:
(a) bore interest at the rate of 8.4% per annum, payable
monthly;
(b) required a minimum monthly amortization payment of
$830;
(c) approximate maturity: unstated, roughly fourteen years,
based on $830 monthly amortization payments.
(4) Seller promises to make the debt service payments on the
$105,000 first mortgage.
(5) Seller promises to deliver a deed to buyer when buyer pays off
the note. However, buyer has a right to demand a deed sooner
by assuming the first mortgage when the balance due under the
note to the seller has been reduced to the balance due under the
first mortgage.
(6) Buyer promises to prepay five years' interest on the note($48,299) and seller gives a $4,000 discount for early payment.
Therefore, buyer pays $44,299 prepaid interest.
(7) Transaction must be closed by December 31, 1962.
In short, although the final contract provided for a $10,000 smaller
purchase price, it gave the seller the same total amount in cash at the clos-
ing as did the initial contract. Now, however, instead of the $63,000 cash
payment being designated as "downpayment," most of it was designated
as interest. Similarly, the annual payments the seller was to receive under
the new contract were roughly the same as the debt service payments Col-
lins would have made under the original contract, but which the seller
would continue to make to the lender under the new contract. In sum, the
dollar amount of Collins' payments, initial and subsequent, remained the
same under the new contract; the only difference was that a much larger
amount was denominated "interest."
The conversion of "purchase price" into "interest payments" was ac-
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complished by what is often referred to as a wraparound note. 13 7 A wrap-
around note, or wraparound mortgage, is essentially a second mortgage
that includes in its face amount the amount of the first mortgage. Wrap-
around notes are typically made at higher rates of interest than the senior
mortgage. Thus, for example, consider a borrower who approaches a
lender and requests a $100X loan and offers as security for repayment a
second mortgage. The borrower tells the lender that the property is en-
cumbered by a first mortgage loan in the amount of $300X that bears in-
terest at the rate of seven percent.' 38 The lender may respond with the
suggestion that the borrower give the lender a note in the face amount of
$400X, which bears interest on that face amount at the rate of eight per-
cent. The lender will advance the borrower only the $100X difference be-
tween the face amount of the two notes, but will meet the debt service
payments on the $300X, seven percent first mortgage. The lender, conse-
quently, not only makes eight percent on the $1 0OX actually advanced, but
also makes money on the fact that it is charging eight percent on the face
amount of the seven percent loan it undertook to service. 139 The type of
note used in Collins required the seller to take more of his "profit" in the
form of "interest" rather than in the form of increased sales price. Note
that if this were upheld, the seller would be disadvantaged because part of
what would have been his capital gain is converted to interest income,
taxed at ordinary rates.
Collins arose at a time when it was black letter law that it was permissi-
ble for cash method taxpayers to deduct up to five years prepaid inter-
est. 1"° The issue was whether Collins could deduct the five years of
"interest" he "prepaid." The court held he could not, stating the case was
indistinguishable on principle from cases such as Knetsch and Goldstein.
The court determined that the figures in the final contract "were com-
pletely arbitrary and fictitious" and explained:
No true indebtedness was created by the December 12 contract.
The installment debt and prepayment of interest provisions in the
contract of December 12, 1962, were shams. They were completely
devoid of economic substance. The certified public accountant
merely juggled the figures that were contained in the earlier offer to
buy and its acceptance until he arrived at the same result. He used
137. The term "wraparound" was nowhere used in the court's opinion. Beware legal
research devices that boast.
138. The borrower may want to preserve the favorable interest rate on the first mortgage
loan or avoid a prepayment penalty on the first mortgage loan, or the borrower may have no
choice other than to keep the first mortgage loan outstanding.
139. The situation just described is the one presented in Rev. Rul. 75-99, 1975-1 C.B.
197, in which the wraparound lender was a real estate investment trust (REIT). The ruling,
for purposes of the Code's REIT provisions, held that
the indebtedness between the [REIT] and the borrower giving rise to an obli-
gation to pay interest is not the total amount of the 'wraparound' loan. Al-
though the borrower signs a note for 400X dollars, the [REIT] actually loans
the borrower 1OOX dollars. Payments by the [REIT] on the senior obligation
are considered to be made on behalf of the borrower from payments received
from the borrower on the 400X dollar note.
Id. (citations omitted).
140. I.T. 3740, 1945 C.B. 109, revoked by Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76.
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other figures to one of which was affixed a label of 'prepaid interest,'
but the amount of [Collins'] immediate payments to the sellers was the
same. No genuine debt was created to support the so-called 'interest'
prepayment. 141
The court further stated that the fact that the seller reported the amount
labeled interest as ordinary income "[was] not significant--especially since
he had a large loss that year." It also rejected Collins' argument that be-
cause he actually entered into a profit-motivated transaction, the purchase
of an apartment building, Goldstein was distinguishable. The court
stated:
The transaction we find to be a sham is not the acquisition of the
apartment house but the prepayment of interest and the loan agree-
ment. We accept the contention that the motivating factor in the
purchase of the apartment house was economic gain. It is the terms
used to support the deduction of prepaid interest (the loan agreement)
which we consider to be a sham.142
B. Code Section 183." Not For Profit Activities
In 1974, many people in the real estate industry were shocked when they
learned of the following statement in the Security and Exchange Commis-
sion's Guide 60 for the Preparation of Registration Statements Relating to
Interests in Real Estate Limited Partnerships:
G. Section 183. The possible impact of this Code section on inves-
tors lacking a profit objective in investing in any tax shelter program
which is expected to generate annual tax losses for tax purposes for a
period of years should be discussed. The discussion should note that
the section may apply to the partners of a partnership notwithstanding
any profit objective the partnership itself may be deemed to have.'13
The statement came as a surprise for two reasons. First, although it had
been rumored that the Service was considering whether section 183 could
be applied to tax shelters, no actual deployment had been officially an-
nounced. Second, section 183 seemed an unlikely choice of weapon.
Section 183, introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, is known as the
"hobby loss" provision because it was designed to prevent taxpayers from
claiming losses from farming and other hobbies. As of 1970, no deduc-
tions attributable to any activity "not engaged in for profit" are allowed
unless they are authorized by section 183.144 It limits deductions attributa-
ble to activities not engaged in for profit to (1) items deductible without
regard to whether the activity is engaged in for profit, such as interest and
real estate taxes, and (2) items deductible if the activity were engaged in
141. 54 T.C. at 1663.
142. Id. at 1665.
143. Securities Act Release No. 5692, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12224, [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,405.
144. I.R.C. § 183(a) provides:
In the case of an activity engaged in by an individual or an electing small
business corporation (as defined m section 137 1(b)), if such activity is not en-
gaged in for profit, no deduction attributable to such activity shall be allowed
under this chapter except as provided in this section.
[Vol. 32
REALTY SHELTERS
for profit, but only to the extent that gross income from the activity for the
year exceeds the deductions in category (1). 145 The Regulations, for ex-
ample, apply the provision to the owner of a beach house who occupies it
for one of the three months of the recreational season, and rents it for the
other two months. 46 Because the beach house is owned primarily for per-
sonal purposes, it is an activity "not engaged in for profit" within the
meaning of section 183. The owner is allowed deductions for mortgage
interest and real estate taxes without regard to whether owning the beach
house is engaged in for profit. Allocation of these expenses between the
two uses of the beach house, therefore, is unnecessary. Because no deduc-
tions are allowed for personal, living, and family expenses, 147 however,
maintenance, utility expense, and depreciation must be allocated between
the personal use and the rental use. Two-thirds of these expenses are at-
tributed to the rental use, and are allowed only to the extent the gross
income from the house exceeds the deductions available independent of
profit purpose; that is, only to the extent gross income exceeds the deduc-
tions for real estate taxes and mortgage interest.1
48
Section 183 defines an "activity not engaged in for profit" as "any activ-
ity other than one with respect to which deductions are allowable for the
taxable year under section 162 [trade or business expenses] or under para-
graph (1) or (2) of section 212 [expenses for the production of income]." 49
A taxpayer will be presumed to engage in profit activity if a profit resulted
in two or more of the five consecutive years ending with the current
year.' 50 The presumption, however, is rebuttable.' On the other hand,
no negative inference is to be drawn from the fact that the taxpayer does
not qualify for the presumption. 52 In determining whether an activity is
engaged in for profit, all the facts are to be taken into account. It is not
necessary that the taxpayer have a "reasonable expectation of profit,"' 53
but "the facts must indicate that the taxpayer entered into the activity, or
145. Id. § 183(b) provides:
In the case of an activity not engaged in for profit . . . there shall be al-
lowed-
(1) the deductions which would be allowable under this chapter for the
taxable year without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in for
profit, and
(2) a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions which would be
allowable under this chapter for the taxable year only if such activity were
engaged in for profit, but only to the extent that the gross income derived
from such activity for the taxable year exceeds the deductions allowable by
reason of paragraph (1).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.13-1(b) (1972).
146. The beach home is used only as an example. The 1976 Act introduced a new I.R.C.
§ 280A, which disallows certain expenses in connection with business use of a home and the
rental of vacation homes.
147. I.R.C. § 262.
148. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(d)(3) (1972).
149. I.R.C. § 183(c).
150. Id. § 183(d).
151. Id. A taxpayer in the earliest years of an activity may postpone a determination
whether the presumption applies until he has engaged in the activity for at least five taxable
years (seven in the case of horses). Id. § 183(e).
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(c)(1) (1972).
153. Id. § 1.183-2(a).
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continued the activity, with the objective of making a profit."' 54 A "small
chance of making a large profit" may be sufficient.' 55
The Regulations list expectation of appreciation in value as one of nine
factors normally to be taken into account to determine whether an activity
is engaged in for profit:
The term 'profit' encompasses appreciation in the value of assets,
such as land, used in the activity. Thus, the taxpayer may intend to
derive a profit from the operation of the activity, and may also intend
that, even if no profit from current operations is derived, an overall
profit will result when appreciation in the value of the land used in
the activity is realized since income from the activity together with the
appreciation of land will exceed expenses of operation.' 56
The holding of property for appreciation, however, may be deemed a sepa-
rate activity from other activity in connection with the property.'
57
In Jasionowski v. Commissioner 58 the Tax Court attempted to explain
the "somewhat enigmatic language of section 183""' and its contribution
to existing law. It noted that section 183 builds upon sections 163 and 212,
and that prior decisions under those sections are still relevant:
Although section 183 has clearly placed a gloss on post-1969 judi-
cial profit-motive inquiries, we think pre-1969 case law in this area
remains relevant. We say this for two reasons. First, section 183(c)
defines an 'activity not engaged in for profit' as an activity with re-
spect to which deductions would not be allowable under section 162
or section 212(1) or (2). Thus, prior cases dealing with profit motive
under these sections retain their vitality. Second, the so-called 'rele-
vant factors' set forth in the regulations are themselves derived from
prior case law . . . and, therefore, we think such prior law has a role
to play in their application. 160
What, then, is the contribution of section 183? The court answered:
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972). The other eight factors are whether the activity is
carried on in a businesslike manner, the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors, the time
and effort spent by the taxpayer on the activity, success in carrying on other activities, the
taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity, the amount of any occa-
sional profits earned, the presence of substantial income from other sources, and the pres-
ence of elements of personal pleasure or recreation.
157. Id. § 1.183-1(d)(1):
Generally, the Commissioner will accept the characterization by the tax-
payer of several undertakings either as a single activity or as separate activi-
ties. . . . If the taxpayer engages in two or more separate activities,
deductions and income from each separate activity are not aggregated either
in determining whether a particular activity is engaged in for profit or in ap-
plying section 183. Where land is purchased or held primarily with the intent
to profit from increase in its value, and the taxpayer also engages in farming
on such land, the farming and the holding of the land will ordinarily be con-
sidered a single activity only if the income derived from farming exceeds the
deductions attributable to the farming activity which are not directly attributa-
ble to the holding of the land (that is, deductions other than those directly
attributable to the holding of the land such as interest on a mortgage secured
by the land, annual property taxes attributable to the land and improvements,
and depreciation of improvements to the land).
158. 66 T.C. 312 (1976).
159. Id. at 320.
160. Id. at 321-22.
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The legislative history surrounding section 183 indicates that one of
the prime motivating factors behind its passage was Congress' desire
to create an objective standard to determine whether a taxpayer was
carrying on a business for the purpose of realizing a profit or instead
was merely attempting to create and utilize losses to offset their in-
come. 161
The Tax Court did not seem to think that the congressional intent to pro-
vide "objective tests to determine subjective intentions" had been very suc-
cessful. First, it noted that the nine separate factors in the Regulations are
not very helpful in dealing with cases that do not involve farming or other
hobbies. Second, the "test under section 183 is not whether the taxpayer's
intention and expectation of profit is reasonable but rather whether such
intention and expectation is bona fide."' 162 Jasionowski is therefore some
authority for the proposition that section 183 precludes the Service from
relying on Goldstein to require a "reasonable" expectation of economic
profit.
Jasionowski is also significant because it disallowed deductions under
section 183 despite the presence of a long-term profit objective. The activ-
ity in question was a transaction between a doctor and a woman who had
been a patient and a friend for twenty years. Her physical condition dete-
riorated to the point that she became unable to work. In 1965, when she
was approximately fifty-five years old, she drew up a will in which she left
her residence to the doctor. None of her relatives were still living, and she
wanted to repay the doctor for his kindness. By 1968, because of her high
medical bills, she could no longer meet the mortgage payments. In order to
avoid foreclosure, she deeded the house to the doctor at a time when its
fair market value was at least $24,000, subject to a mortgage of $7,700.
Contemporaneously, the doctor leased the house back to her for a seven-
year term under a lease that required her to pay all taxes, maintenance
expenses, utility bills, and insurance premiums in connection with the
property. The doctor was to pay the debt service on the mortgage. At the
expiration of the seven-year term, she and the doctor were to renegotiate a
new lease at terms agreeable to both, which would provide for a net annual
rent of five percent on the value of the premises at that time after payment
of taxes, utilities, and insurance. 63
The court said it could not "impute a profit motive to petitioners when
they voluntarily entered into a lease agreement under which, for a period
of 7 consecutive years, they were bound to incur losses as distinguished
from the usual 'start-up' situation where early losses are anticipated but
where effort and imagination could turn the venture towards profit rather
quickly."'" The court said that the doctor's substantial income from his
medical practice was additional evidence indicating the absence of a profit
motive, as was the fact that he had other rental properties that were profit-
161. Id. at 321.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 315.
164. Id. at 322.
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able. The court was unpersuaded by the argument that his primary intent
was to earn lucrative rental income after the expiration of the lease and
make capital gains on the eventual sale of the house, stating:
First, we do not think that any profit motive [the doctor] may have
harbored for the period followin the lease's expiration can be substi-
tuted for [his] intentions during the actual term of the lease. Second,
if the anticipation of eventually selling the house were in itself suffi-
cient to establish that the property was held with a profit-making in-
tent, rare indeed would be the homeowner who purchased a home
several years ago who could not make the same claim. 165
Accordingly, the doctor was held entitled to the deductions claimed for
interest and taxes, but business expense and depreciation deductions were
limited to the extent gross income exceeded the deductions for interest and
taxes. Since there was no such excess, no business expense and deprecia-
tion deductions were allowed.
It is not clear how the Service will attempt to apply section 183 to real
estate tax shelters. The only thing that does seem clear is that it has some-
thing in mind. Recall that section 183, by its terms, applies only to activi-
ties "engaged in by an individual or an electing small business
corporation." Neither the statute nor the legislative history refers to the
application of section 183 to partnerships. Nevertheless, in late 1977 the
Service ruled that section 183 applies to the activities of partnerships.' 66
Its rationale was that the taxable income of a partner is to be computed in
the same manner as in the case of an individual. It further ruled that "the
provisions of section 183 are applied at the partnership level and reflected
in the partners distributive shares."167 The ruling that section 183 applies
at the partnership level is not necessarily inconsistent with the suggestion
in Guide 60 that section 183 may be imposed at the level of the individual
partner. The Service might choose to apply section 183 at both the part-
nership level and at the level of the individual partner. In the analogous
application of the material distortion of income test to prepaid interest, the
Service ruled that the test applies at the partnership level.' 68 One of the
most recent prepaid interest cases, however, declined to state whether a
deduction that passes muster at the partnership level might also be ex-
amined for distortion at the level of the individual partner. 69
165. Id. at 323.
166. Rev. Rul. 77-320, 1977-36 I.R.B. 8.
167. Id.
168. Rev. Rul. 77-304, 1977-35 I.R.B. 9.
169. Resnik v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 74 (1976), involved one of thirty cash method
limited partnerships that were formed on December 31, 1969, and prepaid four years' and
three months' interest on the same date with the capital contributions o the limited partners.
Nothing else occurred. The court considered the problem at the partnership level and con-
cluded:
This is more than a distortion of income; it is 'a distortion of non-income.'.
Having found the income of the partnership to be distorted by the prepaid
interest deduction it is not necessary for us to see whether the income of peti-
tioner-partner is distorted. We do not decide, whether, under different cir-
cumstances, the deduction of prepaid interest by a partnership may not
materially distort the income of the partnership but, nevertheless, might dis-
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C. Code Section 446(b). Material Distortion of Income
Taxpayers are generally free to compute taxable income or loss accord-
ing to any method of accounting they see fit. 7 ' Section 446(b) contains
the basic caveat that the Service may order the taxpayer to compute in-
come in a different manner if the method the taxpayer chooses "does not
clearly reflect income." As discussed above, it was this provision that the
Service relied on to rule that cash method taxpayers could not deduct pre-
payments of interest. When current deduction of the cash payments cre-
ated a "material distortion of income," taxpayers who otherwise reported
according to a cash method were required to report the interest payments
according to an accrual method.
Outside the prepaid interest area, the Service has made little use of sec-
tion 446(b) to challenge real estate transactions, even in cases that appear
to beg for its application. Leslie Co. v. Commissioner,17 1 for example, in-
volved a taxpayer who had set out to obtain a straight mortgage loan to
finance the construction of a custom-made factory on a newly acquired
site. The lender was an insurance company that insisted that the financ-
ing be provided in the form of a sale of the new building to the insurance
company with a contemporaneous lease back of the building to the tax-
payer. The sale price paid by the insurance company was substantially
below the taxpayer's construction cost. On its own books, the taxpayer
capitalized the loss and amortized it over the basic thirty-year term of the
lease back. For tax purposes, however, the taxpayer claimed a deduction
for a loss on the sale of a section 1231 asset.' 72 Over the strenuous objec-
tion of several dissenting Tax Court judges, the deduction was upheld.
The taxpayer was permitted to deduct one-quarter of the cost of its brand-
new, custom-made factory in year one, and section 446(b) was not even
mentioned.
Although section 446(b) has in the past had little impact in the real es-
tate area, the prepaid interest saga indicates that the Service can change its
mind and use section 446(b) more extensively in the future.' 73 One recent
decision has taken many practitioners by surprise and strongly suggests
that the courts will be receptive to a more aggressive use of section 446(b).
tort the partner's income necessitating an examination for distortion at the
partner level.
Id. at 1-82.
170. I.R.C. §§ 446(a), (c).
171. 64 T.C. 247 (1975), aff'd, 539 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1976).
172. Section 1231 is trade or business property, the "best of both worlds" property for tax
purposes. If it is sold at a gain, the gain is capital gain; if it is sold at a loss, the loss is
ordinary loss.
173. In 1977, the Service used § 446(b) to challenge a motion picture tax shelter. A
production-service limited partnership reported according to the cash method of accounting
and deducted the expenditures it made to produce a film. The partnership's production
contract with the owner of the film rights gave it a share in the film proceeds up to a fixed
maximum. The Service ruled that 'the deduction of expenditures in the year incurred
which are the cost of acquiring the contract right to share in the film's proceeds in later years
results in a substantial distortion of income. These expenses therefore are not currently
deductible." Rev. Rul. 77-125, 1977-1 C.B. 130, 131. It required the partnership to write off
its expenditures in accordance with an income forecast method of accounting.
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Zaninovich v. Commissioner'74 involved a two-person farming partnership
that used the cash method of accounting. In October of 1973, the partner-
ship entered into a lease of farm land for a twenty-year period that was to
begin December 1, 1973. Rent in the amount of $27,200 per lease year,
December 1 through November 30, was payable each December 20. This
twelve-month prepayment was in accord with normal farming practice in
the area. Pursuant to the lease provision, on December 20, 1973, the part-
nership paid the rent for the lease year December 1, 1973, to November 30,
1974, and deducted the entire amount in the computation of its 1973 part-
nership income. The Service disallowed the portion of the deduction at-
tributable to 1974, and the Tax Court upheld the disallowance.
Section 162 authorizes a deduction for ordinary and necessary trade or
business expenses, including "rentals or other payments required to be
made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the
trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not
taking title or in which he has no equity."' 75 Although earlier cases had
disallowed cash method taxpayers current deductions for prepaid rentals,
the partnership sought to distinguish these cases on the ground that they
involved prepayments for more than one year, or prepayments that were
made prior to the commencement of the lease term. The Tax Court con-
cluded that these were distinctions without differences:
Regardless of the term, if payment secures possession and use of prop-
erty for a significant portion of a taxable year other than the year in
which payment is made, a deduction is allowed only for that portion
of the payment attributable to the year of payment. The determina-
tive factor is the period to which the payment is to apply; in this re-
gard, the date of payment is immaterial.' 76
The court was also unpersuaded by the fact that lessors of farmland in the
area insist on having twelve months of rent paid during the first month of
a lease year. The court stated: "Such a consideration cannot convert a
payment which is in the nature of a capital expenditure into an expense
deductible under section 162(a)(3) . . . . Simply stated, the $27,200 paid
as rent was not chicken feed, and we decline petitioners' invitation to treat
it as such."' 77
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress has made a clear decision to permit investors in real estate to
continue to claim tax losses in excess of amounts they have at risk by in-
cluding nonrecourse financing in depreciable basis. It has also chosen to
leave unchanged the present rules that permit limited partnerships, includ-
ing limited partnerships in which a thinly capitalized corporation is the
174. 69 T.C. No. 47, 69 T.C. (CCH) 2252 (Jan. 25, 1978).
175. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3).
176. 69 T.C. (CCH) at 2254.
177. ld. at 2254-55. The court's "chicken feed" pun was a reference to the fact that the
courts have been especially permissive in the area of deductions for prepaid feed expenses.
See generally Hawkinson, Farm Expenses and General Accounting Principles, 22 TAx L.
REv. 237 (1967). But see Clement v. United States, U.S. Ct. Cl. No. 131-75 (July 14, 1978).
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only general partner, to be classified for tax purposes as partnerships
rather than as corporations. The Carter administration has recommended
to Congress that limited partnerships be classified as corporations for tax
purposes if they have in excess of fifteen limited partners.' s It is proba-
bly safe to say that the proposal has no serious chance of success in the
Congress. Furthermore, no other legislation limiting real estate tax shelters
appears imminent. In the absence of further action by Congress, the Serv-
ice can, at a minimum, be expected to limit realty shelters to present deci-
sions upholding them. It can be expected to give close scrutiny to the
economic substance of transactions, and to particular features of transac-
tions, and to use general principles opposing tax avoidance to disallow all
practices that are not now specifically protected by existing authority.
178. President Carter's Tax Proposals, H.R. 12078, § 244 (introduced April 12, 1978).
1978]

